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The present active business provisions are the culmination of sixty years
of legislative development. In order to present the considerations which have
combined to require a distinction between "active" and "passive" business
income in current federal income tax legislation, the first part of this article
sketches the evolution of that concept through the 1972 amendments of the
Income Tax Act. Part 1E examines the social and economic purposes intended
to be effected by the present sections 95 and 125 and the role that the active
business device plays in achieving those purposes. The last part analyses
administrative and judicial interpretations of active business in terms of their
consistency with perceived policy objectives as well as their substantive de-
scription of the term.
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVE
BUSINESS PROVISIONS
Two fundamental problems confront the architect of corporate tax sta-
tutes: preventing taxpayers from using the fact of incorporation to shelter
income from personal investments, personal services, contributions from a
spouse or professional activities from high personal rates of taxation, and
preventing taxpayers from accumulating income from sheltered sources by
leaving it in the corporation as undistributed surplus. While other abuses will
develop in response to a given scheme of corporate taxation, these two points
are central to any system which recognizes the independent legal personality
of the corporation and its shareholders, and they have been accorded in-
creasingly sophisticated treatment in Canadian tax legislation. Continuing
reliance on the concept of active business to counter these abuses is evident
in the development of corporate tax legislation.
Active business has also gained currency as a technique of distinguishing
business and investment incomes of corporations for purposes of differentiat-
ing the tax treatment of those incomes, not to counter tax avoidance, but to
achieve social and economic objectives as well as objectives of tax equity and
neutrality. This use of active business in legislation governing extraterritorial
corporate operations is a recent development.
A. Active Business And Domestic Corporations
1. Income War Tax Act
When the Income War Tax Act1 was first enacted in Canada, no attempt
was made to differentiate the business corporation from the so-called "incor-
porated pocketbook" for tax purposes, nor were classes of corporate sources
subjected to segregated treatment. Section 3 (1) of the original act did contain
a cryptic reference to undivided and undistributed gains and profits2 in the
extended definition of income, but that language was never construed as bring-
' S.C. 1917, c. 28.
2 Section 3(1) provided: "For the purposes of this Act, 'income' . . . shall in-
clude . . . dividends or profits ... received . from stocks, . . . whether such gains or
profits are divided or distributed or not . .. "
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ing undistributed income of a corporation into the income of its shareholders.3
There was, therefore, no attempt made in the Income War Tax Act to reserve
the tax benefits of incorporation for a particular class of income-producing
operations.
Unreasonable accumulations were dealt with directly. Section 3 (4) con-
ferred upon the Minister the power to allocate accumulated income to share-
holders where there was no valid business purpose for the accumulation.
4
Surprisingly, there are no reported decisions which discuss the effect of this
provision at all, and no evidence upon which to assess its impact on incor-
porated investments. Taking the United States experience as a guideline, an
excess accumulations provision can be a powerful tool in counteracting the use
of corporations as tax shelters.5
Whatever the efficacy of the accumulations provision in the Income War
Tax Act, it was superceded in 1926 by two very pointed provisions which
sought to deal with the related problems of sheltering investment income by
incorporation and double taxation of incorporated small businesses. The "fam-
ily corporation" concept provided that an actively operated corporation would
pay only one layer of taxation by permitting the shareholders to elect to be
taxed as if the corporation were a partnership, in effect transforming the sepa-
rate legal entity of the corporation into a "conduit pipe" for all income of the
corporation in each taxation year. One interesting limitation on the avail-
ability of the election was that dominating shareholders had to "take an active
part in" or be "actively employed in the business of the corporation." 6 In
domestic corporate legislation, this is the earliest attempt to differentiate in-
sThe issue was not pressing because section 3(1) (d) of the Income War Tax Act
exempted dividend income from the normal tax.
4 The original version of section 3 (4) provided for inclusion of undistributed profits
"unless the Minister is of opinion that the accumulation... is not made for the purpose
of evading the tax, and is not in excess of what is reasonably required for the purposes
of the business". S.C. 1919, c. 55, s. 2(3) modified the discretionary clause in section
3(4) to provide that undistributed income would not be included in taxable income
unless the accumulation was in excess of reasonable business requirements and was for
the purpose of evading the tax. The excessive accumulations provision was dropped in
the 1948 revision.
G It is intriguing to note that the accumulated earnings tax imposed on corporations
under section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 originated as a provision very
similar in language to section 13 of the Income War Tax Act, including the notion of
a deemed dividend of excess accumulations to shareholders. The American approach is
strengthened by section 533(b) which provides that "a mere holding or investment com-
pany" will be deemed to be accumulating profits "beyond the reasonable needs of the
business" and therefore engaged in avoiding the income tax on its shareholders. See
generally Bittker and Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Share-
holders (3d ed. Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1971) at 8-1 to 8-51; D. Kahn,
Baic Corporate Taxation (2d ed. Ann Arbor: Institute of Continuing Legal Education,
1973) at 171-72, 201-07.
0 lncome War Tax Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 97, ss. 2(1)(d), l(l),(3). In order for
the election to be valid, certain conditions had to be met: 75% of the shares had to be
owned by one family and at least one family member had to actively participate in the
operations, or 80% of the shares had to be owned by persons "actively employed in
the business."
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corporated business operations from mere investment operations. The mean-
ing of "active" in this context never received explication.7
The personal corporation was introduced along with the family corpora-
tion,8 and it was this provision that was designed to counter the use of cor-
porations to shelter the accumulation of investment income from escalating
rates of personal taxation. The assumption that a family corporation provi-
sion was intended to apply to corporations which had little or no investment
income is strengthened by the definition of the family corporation as "other
than a personal corporation," 9 because a personal corporation was defined
as a corporation which derived more than twenty-five percent of its receipts
from investments. At the time of their introduction and for the short time
during their joint lives, then, the family and personal corporation provisions
yielded these results: (1) the family corporation election was available to a
corporation the business of which was "actively" conducted by one or more
shareholders; (2) the family corporation election was also available to a
corporation which met the test in (1) even if less than twenty-five percent of
its income was from specified investments; (3) family corporation and ordi-
nary corporation treatment was automatically denied a corporation which
met the personal corporation definition, even if a substantial part of its income
came from the conduct of a bona fide business undertaking.
2. The Personal Corporation Era
This short list of possibilities reflects the fact that the draftsmen had a
singleminded view of the small corporation, expecting that it be used either
for investment or for business, but not for both at the same time, although
7 McGregor refers to section 22 of the Income War Tax Act as containing a re-
quirement that the corporation carry on "an active business," but in fact the provision
had no such requirement; to qualify as a family corporation, certain of the shareholders
were required to "take an active part in the business operations of the corporation" or
be persons "actively employed in the business of the corporation." While this language
certainly does suggest that the operations of the corporation must constitute a business
and not mere investment, it does not follow that the business must be an "active busi-
ness" unless one accepts the proposition that in the context of corporate income, "active
business" serves the same function as does the use of the term "business" in classifying
an unincorporated taxpayer's sources of income. See G. McGregor, Personal Corpora-
tions (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1960) at 2-5.
8Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1926, c. 10, s. 3(10) (a), (b) provided as follows:
3(10) (a) For the purposes of this Act a 'personal corporation' means a corpora-
tion or joint stock company . . . controlled directly or indirectly by one person
who resides in Canada, . . . the gross revenue of which is to the extent of one-
quarter or more derived from one or more of the following sources, namely:-
from the ownership of or the trading or dealing in bonds, stocks or shares,
debentures, mortgages, hypothecs, bills, notes or other similar property, or from
the lending of money with or without security, or by way of rent, annuity, royalty,
interest or dividend, or from or by virtue of any right, title or interest in or to any
estate or trust.
(b) The income of a personal corporation ... shall be deemed to be dis-
tributed as a dividend to the shareholders thereof and shall in their hands consti-
tute taxable income for each year . . . whether actually distributed by way of
dividend or not
9 Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1927, c. 97, s. 2(1) (d).
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up to twenty-four percent of the family corporation's income could be from
investment without disqualifying it. Even this slight recognition of the some-
times mixed uses of a small corporation disappeared from the Income War
Tax Act, however, when the family corporation was abolished in 1932.10
From 1933 until 1949 the only significant feature of the taxation of small
corporations was the personal corporation provision. The only option of a
private or closely held corporation during that period was the personal cor-
poration provision, which applied automatically to any corporation which
derived twenty-five percent or more of its income from the specified sources.
As personal rates of taxation became increasingly onerous, classification as
a personal corporation ceased to be an advantage and took on the character
of a penalty, especially in those cases where the formation of the corporation
was motivated not by a desire to shelter accumulations, but to provide an
efficient enterprise form which for one reason or another might have some
investment income in a given year.
Part of the crudeness of the personal corporation device was eliminated
in 1940 with the introduction of the "active business" requirement, which
operated to exempt from the mandatory personal corporation provision those
corporations which carried on "an active financial, commercial or industrial
business."' 1 It is clear that such a qualification would operate to prevent a
corporation which was more than an "incorporated pocketbook" to escape
treatment as a personal corporation if its investment income rose above the
permissible level, but it is also clear that the "either-or" mentality of the
draftsman had simply reversed the inequities. Instead of achieving an unin-
tended result where a business corporation received too much investment in-
come in a given year, it was possible for an investment corporation to slip
out of classification as a personal corporation by accidental or intentional
acquisition of an active business.12 Thus a corporation which otherwise fell
to be classified as a personal corporation was either treated as an ordinary
corporation if it had some active business, or ignored for tax purposes if it
had no active business and derived at least twenty-five percent of its income
from specified investment sources.
3. Personal Corporations and Tax-paid Surplus
The disparity of treatment accorded the ostensible business corporation
10 The family corporation provision was repealed only a few years after its enact-
ment. S.C. 1932, c. 43, s. 80. For the rationale for its implementation and repeal, see
McGregor, supra note 7.
11 S.C. 1940, c. 34 added the requirement that the corporation not have an "active
commercial or industrial business." By S.C. 1942, c. 28 the phrase was expanded to its
mature form: "active financial, commercial or industrial business."
12 See Glaspie v. MNR, 63 D.T.C. 828 (T.A.B.) for an illustration of a corporation's
failure to take itself outside the operation of the personal corporation provision by ac-
quisition of an active business. The Board ruled that operation of a cigar store for two
weeks at a net loss of $94.00 did not constitute an "active financial, commercial or
industrial business." This decision had to have been motivated by antiavoidance con-
siderations, for there was no de minimus clause in the personal corporation provision.
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and the investment corporation' s was further exaggerated by the introduction
of graduated rates of corporate taxation. The initial provision imposed a ten
percent tax on the first $10,000 of corporate income from whatever source
derived.' 4 With marginal rates of personal taxation rising as high as eighty
percent compared with a low rate of ten percent for an ordinary corporation,
the concept of "active financial, commercial or industrial business" assumed
crucial importance for the shareholders of small or closely held corporations.
From 1952 to 1972, the amount of corporate income which was eligible for
a lower rate of tax continued to increase, until the rate was twenty-one per-
cent on the first $35,000 and forty-seven percent on the excess.1'
The gulf between the tax treatment of the ordinary business corporation
and the personal corporation was further widened by the introduction of
"tax-paid surplus." Not content with accumulation of profits beyond the actual
needs of the corporation, shareholders of corporations which managed to
avoid classification as personal corporations eventually began to view retained
surpluses of their corporations as nontaxable accretions to capital which ought
to be distributable tax-free, not as income in the ordinary sense. In response
to this delusion, and in an attempt to coax some of this petrified surplus back
into circulation, "tax-paid surplus" provisions were enacted, at first temporarily
and then permanently.' 6
By the end of this phase, and during the years when tax reform was
under consideration, the scheme under which the Canadian close corporation
was taxed consisted of four principal elements: a low rate of twenty-one per-
cent on the first $35,000 of the taxable income of a corporation-which re-
duced rate was available to a public or private corporation without regard to
size; a dividend tax credit to shareholders equal to twenty percent of the
amount of dividends received to encourage distribution rather than accumula-
13 Not to be confused with "investment companies" which derived almost all their
income from investment in stocks, bonds and securities. These companies were exempted
from the corporate layer of taxation on different terms. See Income Tax Act, S.C. 1952,
c. 148, ss. 52(1) (1), 62; formerly Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1927, c. 97, ss. 4(w), 9(8).
14 Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c. 52, s. 36, as amended by S.C. 1949, c. 25, s. 9.
The corporate rate under this new regime was 10% on the first $10,000 of income and
33% of the excess over $10,000. The lower rate of corporate tax was, of course, in-
applicable to personal corporations, as they were exempt from all corporate taxation.
15 ncome Tax Act, S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 39(1)(a), (b), as amended. At that time
the top marginal rate was 80%.
16 From 1930 through 1934, surpluses accumulated before 1930 could be distributed
to shareholders without incurring tax liability, so long as the corporation paid a special
15% tax on the surplus before distribution. S.C. 1945, c. 23, s. 95 provided another
opportunity for distributions of tax-paid surplus in the years 1945 through 1947, this
time pertaining to surpluses accumulated through 1939. The rate of tax paid by the
corporation, again, was nominal, ranging from 15% to 35%. The 1948 Act was
amended by S.C. 1950, c. 40, s. 30 to make permanent the election to convert un-
distributed income on hand to tax-paid undistributed surplus by payment of a prefer-
ential rate of tax. Section 957 of the 1948 Act was renumbered section 105 in the 1952
revision, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, and the section has been perpetuated in sections 82 and 196
of the 1972 Act, under which pre-1972 surpluses can be cleared out at preferential rates.
Note that Bill C-56 proposes the abolition of this system by 1978.
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tion of surplus; a flat fifteen percent tax payable by the corporation on after-tax
surpluses accumulated in taxation years prior to 1949, the payment of that tax
then enabling the corporation to make a tax-free distribution of that surplus to
shareholders; and a personal corporation provision which put controlling
shareholders of corporations which derived most of their income from invest-
ments in the same tax position as those individuals who held investments
directly.17
4. The 1972 Amendments
Whereas the scheme under the 1952 Act did not effectively discriminate
between investment income and income from an active commercial or indus-
trial business in a closely held Canadian corporation, the scheme under the
1972 Act is more sophisticated in achieving differentiated treatment of the
two types of income. The principal ingredients of the tax on Canadian con-
trolled private corporations18 are fourfold: (1) all corporations pay the full
corporate rate of tax on all their incomes;'9 (2) Canadian controlled private
corporations may take advantage of the small business deduction20 by taking as
a credit against the tax otherwise payable an amount which is twenty-one per-
cent of income from active business, within certain limits;21 (3) a further tax
incentive is available in the form of a deduction based on manufacturing and
processing profits from an active business2; and (4) a refundable tax on in-
vestment income-which includes "income from a source that is a business
other than an active business"23-- is available to the corporation when it
actually pays a dividend out of that income.24
The combined effect of these provisions is to permit qualifying small
businesses to accumulate income from active business operations while en-
couraging distribution of profits from investments, thereby integrating corpor-
ate investment income into the individual shareholder's income in much the
same way as occurred under the personal corporation provision. The major
differences between the old and new approaches to providing a small business
incentive and integrating corporate investment income with the shareholder's
personal income are that the reduced rate of taxation is available only to
qualifying private corporations, not to all corporations as in the 1952 Act,
and the crude active-passive classification under the personal corporation pro-
vision has given way to a refinement which permits corporate income to be
taxed at rates specially designed for each source of corporate income.
The small business deduction was not included in the reforms proposed
17 S.C. 1952, c. 148, ss. 38, 39, 67, 68 and 105, as amended.
18Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss. 125(6) (a), 89(1)(a).
19 Section 123.
20 Section 125(1).
21 Section 125(1)(c) and (d), 125(2), 125(6) (b), as amended.
2 Section 125.1.
2 Section 129(4) (a) (iii).24 Section 129(1).
1978]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
by the Carter Commission Report.25 The Carter report offered a significantly
different approach to taxation of small business, 26 an approach which involved
total abolition of the preferential tax rate of twenty-one percent of corporate
income under $35,000 and an incentive in the form of accelerated depreciation
on capital equipment for new and small unincorporated businesses. Incorpo-
rated small businesses were to be protected from the effect of the higher rates
of corporate taxation by a new option to be taxed as a partnership.
This reform of the system of taxing small businesses was based on rea-
soning which was heavily criticized by proponents of small business.27 The
Commission Report argued that the preferential low rate of taxation on cor-
porate income under $35,000 combined with the dividend tax credit operated
to levy an effective marginal rate of 38.78% on corporate income distributed
to a shareholder in the fifty percent tax bracket-a concession which, it was
argued, was particularly unfair because it was applicable to corporate income
only, and did not extend to the incomes of unincorporated business.28 The dual
rate of corporate tax came under further criticism because there was no ra-
tional nexus between eligibility for the low rate and ability to form capital
on the part of a particular type of corporation, because the low rate tended
to cushion the market pressures on inefficient and declining firms, and because
the concession had given rise to numerous loopholes which had to be coun-
tered with complicated provisions.
The Carter Report did acknowledge the need for an incentive for new
businesses, distinguishing between the effect on the economy of new busi-
nesses and small businesses. New businesses, regardless of size, it was rea-
soned, promote competition and effectuate efficient allocation of resources,
whereas small businesses represent a threat to the Canadian standard of living:
Although directly or indirectly subsidizing small businesses is sometimes justified
on political or social grounds, maintaining an environment by countless numbers
of small inefficient business units exacts a substantial cost in the long run in terms
of a lower standard of living for Canadians. 29
The Report rationalized that other reforms of the corporate tax system
would solve the problem small businesses have traditionally experienced in
obtaining financing and that any further concession to small business would
be counterproductive. Thus it was proposed to aid small businesses, whether
2 5 The small business deduction which was eventually enacted as section 125(1)
was originally proposed in the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Com-
merce, Report on the White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform Presented to the Senate
of Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970) at 65, 79-82 [hereinafter Senate Report].
26 See generally, Can. 4 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter
Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) at 267-87.
2 7 See, e.g., I. Asper, The Benson Iceberg (Toronto: Clark Owen & Co., 1970)
at 221-30; Canadian Tax Foundation, Annual Conference Papers (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation, 1967) at 79-114; MacIntyre and Fields, The White Paper: Black Looks
from Small Corporations (1970), 18 Can. Tax J. 131.
28 4 Carter Report, supra note 26, at 268.
29 Id. at 272.
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they be established or just commencing operations, by means of a rapid write-
off of capital cost.80
The Carter Commission recommendations were incorporated into the
White Paper on Tax Reform with few alterations, the most important pro-
posals being the abolition of the two-tier corporate tax structure and the
establishment of an election by a corporation to be taxed as a partnership.31
However, popular reaction to the proposed treatment of small business influ-
enced the Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce32 and the Committee
on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs" to reject the abolition of the low
rate of tax.
While the Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs agreed
with the Carter Commission and the White Paper that the pro forma lower
rate of corporate tax on the first $35,000 of corporate income was "inequita-
ble as between incorporated and unincorporated taxpayers,"84 it took the
position that "healthy small businesses are essential to the economic well-
being of Canada."35 The Committee was of the opinion that even if inequities
as between incorporated and unincorporated businesses arose, some incentive
must be given to small businesses with growth potential. However, the Com-
mittee refrained from commenting on the various incentive proposals which
it had considered.
The Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce took a much
more constructive position in its Report on the White Paper. As a conse-
quence of its rejection of the integration scheme, the Senate Committee recom-
mended that the low rate on the first $35,000 of taxable income be retained
but only for the "business income" of small business corporations.
These recommendations were based on policy considerations which had
been rejected by the Carter Commission and the White Paper. First, the
Senate Committee took the position that the low rate on the first $35,000 of
taxable corporate income was instituted "in order that the small corporation
could generate funds for growth and expansion"806 and that in the absence of
an effective solution for financing problems of small business, the incentive
should be retained. Second, the Senate Committee concluded that there was
no purpose to be achieved in establishing equity as between incorporated and
unincorporated taxpayers, 7 for unincorporated taxpayers-for example, em-
ployees and professionals-remain unincorporated precisely because there is
80 4 Carter Report, supra note 26, at 276-82; 6 Carter Report, supra note 26, at
125-28.
81 Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer,
1969) at 4.30, 4.21 [hereinafter White Paper].
82 Senate Report, supra note 25, at 63.
33 Can. Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, House of
Commons, Eighteenth Report Respecting the White Paper an Tax Reform (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1970) at 51-53 [hereinafter Finance Report].
84 Id. at 51.
85 Id. at 52.
Z6 Senate Report, supra note 25, at 8.
37 Id. at 81.
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no benefit to be derived from incorporation. 8 The Committee was also of the
opinion that the aggressive small business corporation does not compete with
the nongrowth unincorporated business.
The Senate Committee, however, did agree that there were defects in
the two-tier system and attempted to cure them with its recommendations.
It suggested that the incentive be made available only to the small business
corporation, since large corporations and the economy were "dependent upon
growing small corporations". The Committee also recommended that taxable
investment income of a corporation be excluded from the income in respect
of which the incentive was to be calculated2 9
B. Active Business and Controlled Foreign Corporations
Many of the considerations which shaped the present scheme of taxation
of domestic close corporations have received articulation in the FAPI rules40
governing the taxation of closely-held foreign affiliates of Canadian taxpayers.
Briefly summarized, these are: (1) noninterference with accumulation of
surpluses in a corporation which has a bona fide business undertaking; (2)
discouragement of abuse of the corporate entity as a means of sheltering in-
vestment income and income from other than a bona fide business undertaking
from high rates of personal taxation; (3) grant of tax preferences to types of
business undertakings which are seen as beneficial to the Canadian economy.
Before the 1972 revisions, the centre of attention was the corporation
which was incorporated, financed and controlled in Canada, but which con-
ducted its operations elsewhere and had no assets located in Canada. It is in
38 Strictly speaking, that is not true. The taxpayers in a number of cases have
benefitted considerably despite the fact that they were employees. See, e.g., Cameron v.
MNR, 72 D.T.C. 6325 (S.C.C.). Also, the benefits of incorporation and the resultant tax
advantages are slowly becoming available to Canadian professionals: See H. Graschuk,
The Professional Corporation in Alberta (1977), 25 Can. Tax J. 109, which discusses
in detail the consequences of recent amendments to Alberta's Companies Act that
enable professionals to incorporate.
39 The specific terms of its recommendations were, in pertinent part:
[]t is the considered opinion of this Committee that the following recommenda-
tions be made:
(a) That the present two tier corporate tax system be retained.
(b) That the two tier corporate tax system be for the benefit of the small business
corporation only, and not for the large business corporation, the latter corpo-
ration paying the full rate on all its income.
(c) That in respect of the small business corporation, the low rate would be
applicable only to business income, and not to other business income, and not
to other sources of income such as taxable investment income, which should
be taxed at full corporate rates. The investment corporation should be
excluded.
(i) That'in defining business profits, reference be made to industrial and com-
mercial profits, including farming and fishing operations.
40 "FAPI" is an acronym for "foreign accrual property income, roughly translated
as investment and non-arm's length service income." See section 95(2) (b) of the 1972
Act. Sections 91 through 95, and 126, together with Regulations sections 5901 through
5907, comprise the system which governs taxation of income that is derived from a
source which is a nonresident corporation.
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the legislation contrived to tax these corporations that the first attempts to
discriminate between bona fide business undertakings and tax shelter opera-
tions may be found. Of particular importance in this regard are the words
employed by the legislature to achieve the distinction now sought to be made
with "active business." This discussion focuses on two phases: the period from
1917 through 1971, when Canadian claims on companies with foreign opera-
tions were fairly modest, and developments under the 1972 Act, when the net
of the Income Tax Act was thrown more widely.
1. The Years of Grace: 1917 to 1972
The Income War Tax Act41 imposed an income tax of four percent on cor-
porate income in excess of $3,000 and all corporations "residing... or carry-
ing on business in Canada" were subject to this impost. In 1918, an important
exception to that broad jurisdiction was enacted:
4. The following income shall not be liable to taxation hereunder:-(k) the income
of incorporated companies whose business and assets are carried on and situate
entirely outside Canada.42
While it might seem obvious from our perspective that this provision was
begging for abuse, refinements were slow to appear.
According to the plain language of the section, the Canadian corporate
income tax could be avoided entirely by the simple expedient of (a) conduct-
ing all business operations outside Canada and (b) keeping all corporate
assets outside Canada. Of course, it is practically impossible to uproot a
thriving bona fide business undertaking and transplant it to another country
without risking the loss of some customers, employees and vital counections-
but this was not the manipulation which the exemption facilitated. Rather, it
allowed taxpayers who had been required by the Income War Tax Act to pay
Canadian tax on investment income to avoid taxation by the simple expedient
of transferring the corporation which held those assets to another country and
to let the income accumulate.
So long as the production of income from those assets looked like the
conduct of business outside Canada, the requirements of section 4(k) were
met and tax exemption was achieved until the income was repatriated as
corporate dividends. Unfortunately, the definition of "business" in section
4(k) before the enactment of limiting amendments was never litigated.48
41 S.C. 1917, c. 28, s. 4(2).
42 S.C. 1918, c. 25, s. 4, adding s. 5(k) to the Income War Tax Act. The section
was renumbered as section 4(k) in R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.
43The only reported case under section 4(k) did not reach the point squarely.
Alberta Pacific Consolidated Oils v. MNR, [1974] Ex. C.R. 48, 2 D.T.C. 886, turned on
the finding that an unsuccessful attempt to find oil in Canada constituted a "business
operation" and that royalties, leases and other rights connected with the exploration were
"4assets" such that their situs in Canada also operated to defeat the taxpayer's claim for an
exemption. It was also noted that if necessary, it would be possible to hold that the
lease of part of the taxpayer's business premises to another party amounted to a "busi-
ness operation." However, that was not the basis for the decision and without taking
full account of the purposes of the legislation, it would not follow automatically that
such a broad view of "business operation" would be taken if the rental property were
located on the other side of the border.
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It is reported that the original version of section 4(k) was abused freely44
and thus the slow process of qualifying its application to suit its purpose got
underway. The first major limitation imposed on the section 4(k) exemption
was an amendment in 193345 which precluded personal corporations from
qualifying for the exemption. It will be recalled that it was not until 1940
that the "active business" requirement was grafted onto the personal corpora-
tion provision, so that tax liability under section 21 or exemption under sec-
tion 4(k) depended entirely on whether more than twenty-five percent of the
corporate income derived from enumerated forms of income-producing prop-
erty. The 1936 amendments further limited the availability of the 4(k) exemp-
tion, restricting it to corporations which had "business operations" which were
either "of an industrial, mining, commercial, public utility or public service
nature" or "of an investment or financial nature. '46 Resident corporations
with investment operations situated outside Canada were no longer able to
avail themselves of the exemption. Reading these limitations together with the
provisions enacted in 1933 which required resident corporations to pay a five
percent withholding tax on dividends to nonresident shareholders, it can be
seen that Canada was beginning to resile from the generous position first
expressed in section 4(k).
The "either-or" mentality that received expression in the personal cor-
poration provisions also prevailed in the taxation of foreign "industrial, min-
ing, commercial, public utility and public service" corporations. So long as
all of the requirements of section 4(k) (i) were met, such a corporation could
repatriate its surpluses and accumulate income therefrom tax-free in Canada.
The framers of the revised section 4(k) had little faith in the power of the
term "business operations, ' '47 for in addition to the requirement that the cor-
poration have "business operations," the amendment required that they be of
an "industrial, mining, commercial . . ." or "investment or financial" nature.
This is the earliest attempt by a Canadian draftsperson to give expression to
the concept of a "bona fide business undertaking" in regulating tax treatment,
and it may be viewed as the predecessor to the term "active business" in func-
tion if not in exact meaning.
The tax holiday came to an abrupt end in 1959 when the entire exemp-
tion was withdrawn; the time had come, it was suggested, for an examination
of Canada's position in transnational trade and its tax policies in relation
thereto.48 The result of that conscientious and enlightened investigation was
the reenactment in identical terms of the exemption later that year, with one
modification: a corporation could qualify for the foreign business corporation
exemption only it it had so qualified before the operation of the exemption
44See I. Wahn, Foreign Business Corporations (1959), 13 Conf. Rep. 224 passim.
This article gives a full and lucid legislative history of section 71 of the 1952 Act.
45 S.C. 1933, c. 14, s. 2, amending s. 4(k).
46 S.C. 1936, c. 38, s. 4, adding paras. (i) and (ii).
47 Clevite Development Co. v. MNR, 61 D.T.C. 1093 per Thurlow I. (Ex. Ct.) has
since demonstrated that their fears were groundless.
48 See H. Crate, Foreign Business Corporations (1959), 13 Conf. Rep. 238; R.
MacKay, Foreign Business Corporations (1959), 13 Conf. Rep. 242.
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was suspended.49 From 1959 until the enactment of the 1972 reform amend-
ments, only pre-1959 foreign business corporations were exempt from cor-
porate taxation; any resident corporations were liable for corporate income
tax on their world income, just like any other "person" resident in Canada.
During the period from 1918 until the implementation of the FAPI rules,
the jurisdiction over corporate foreign source income grew from an almost
total abnegation of jurisdiction over income earned abroad to what might be
thought of a "normal" jurisdiction, whereby corporate foreign income was
brought into taxable income, subject to foreign tax credits and bilateral tax
treaties. This "normal" jurisdiction, however, extended only to incomes of
corporations formed in Canada or resident in Canada, and left one avenue
open to Canadians who sought to shelter investment operations or accumula-
tions. By the simple expedient of forming corporations in another country,
and making certain that the corporation was not "resident" by the common
law or statutory tests, Canadians could remove foreign source income from
the reach of the fisc. By selecting the country of incorporation, investment or
operation judiciously, income could be generated with little or no exposure to
current tax liability, and because of the separate legal entities of the corpora-
tion and shareholder, corporate foreign source income tax was subject to
Canadian income taxation only upon repatriation as dividends to shareholders.
All this was changed by the FAPI rules.
2. The FAPI Provisions
"Foreign accrual property income" is identified in section 95(1) (b) (i)
and (ii) as "incomes for the year from property and businesses other than
active businesses" plus taxable capital gains reasonably allocable to 1976 or
subsequent years. An extended definition of FAPI is set out in section 95(2),
"determination of certain components of foreign accrual property income,"
but this section controls the classification of only two types of income-pas-
sive income which is incident to the conduct of active business and certain
income from services.
The FAPI provisions were intended to discourage the use of tax havens
to reduce or defer current Canadian tax liability for extraterritorial income-
generating activities. These provisions follow the outlines of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code Subpart F provisions enacted in 1962, insofar as they seek
to nullify tax avoidance effects of foreign business operations by impos-
ing current tax liability on controlling shareholders with respect to undistri-
buted income arising out of "passive" business as distinguished from "active"
business of the corporation.5 0
While the Carter Commission was emphatic about closing off existing
tax haven loopholes, little attention was devoted to the crucial distinction be-
49 The 1952 Act, s. 71(5), added by S.C. 1959, c. 45, s. 19.
50 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, s. 954(c) (3). For a discussion of the mechanics
of Subpart F, see I. Choate et al., Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign
Taxpayers-History, Analysis and Prospects (1971), 44 Temple L.Q. 441 at 466-71.
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tween "active" and "passive" income; instead, the report addressed itself to
the difference between income from business and income from property:
Property income is composed mainly of the normal forms of return from the in-
vestment of capital, the lending of money or the rental or licensing of property in
another country, where the activity is not of such a character as to constitute the
carrying on of a business. These forms of income (dividends, interest, rents and
royalties) are usually subject, on distribution to a resident of another country,
to "withholding" taxes levied by the source country.51
The Carter Commission was favorably impressed by the United States Subpart
F provisions, which relied upon a distinction between active and passive in-
come but which defined passive income in far greater detail than did the Com-
mission or any of the other bodies responsible for the eventual enactment
of the FAPI rules.
This lack of precision on the part of the Commission Report was em-
bodied in the White Paper proposals respecting foreign source income, which
erred in relying too heavily on reference to the United States Subpart F legis-
lation to give full meaning to its proposal.52 In contrast, the Committee on
Finance found the Subpart F rules to be unnecessarily complex and broad in
scope, 53 and the Committee on Banking rejected the passive income proposals
of the White Paper as a "grave error." The Committee claimed that the Am-
erican experience had proven Subpart F rules to be "inordinately complicated"
and an "inefficient tool."5 4 As a consequence of the debate over the appropri-
ateness of the model, little useful discussion was devoted to the explicit results
intended to be achieved by the implementation of such a system, or to the
distinction to be drawn between active and passive income.
According to the terms of the provision that was finally enacted, FAPI
can arise out of the operation of but one kind of business organization-the
foreign affiliate. 55 A foreign affiliate can be either a nonresident corporation
or a nonresident trust, a nonresident trust being deemed to be a foreign affi-
liate for purposes of these rules. The consequences of being categorized as a
foreign affiliate are not unduly burdensome for shareholders of corporations
resident in a country which has a tax treaty with Canada and whose income
arises from the conduct of active business in a tax treaty country. 0 As long
as such a corporation has no FAPI, dividends paid to shareholders resident
in Canada will be considered to be paid out of exempt surplus if the resident
514 Carter Report, supra note 26, at 497.
0 The White Paper describes the foreign passive income proposals in paragraphs
6.20 and 6.21:
To counter tax-haven abuse, it is proposed to introduce United States-type legisla-
tion to deal with "passive?' income. This is income of a foreign company which is
not carrying on bona fide operations but to which income from other sources-
dividends, interest, royalties and trans-shipment profits-is diverted. The U.S. law
provides that in such circumstances the U.S. controlling shareholders are taxed
on a current basis whether or not the income is distributed to them.
53Finance Report, supra note 25, at 88.
64 Id. at76.
55 See section 95(1) (b), (1) (d), (4) (a) and (4) (b) for details of the classification.
56 Regulations section 5907(1) (b) (iv).
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taxpayer is a Canadian corporation, or will be included in gross income sub-
ject to normal gross-up and tax credit rules if the resident taxpayer is an indi-
vidual. The most important component of exempt surplus is active business
income.57
If the foreign affiliate derives income from an active business after 1975
in a country with which Canada does not or is not deemed to have a tax
treaty, or has "income... from property or businesses other than active busi-
nesses," any dividends paid to its shareholder resident in Canada must be
included as gross income in the year received by the taxpayer, although the
dividends do carry with them an underlying foreign tax credit.
Thus the definition of "active business" is important to the tax planner
who seeks to arrange business activities of the foreign affiliate to give rise to
income from "active business" income which is therefore the source of tax
exempt dividends. If income is foreign accrual property income, then the tax
consequences depend on whether the entity is a controlled foreign affiliate
of a Canadian resident.5 8 Where a foreign affiliate amounts to a controlled
foreign affiliate,5 9 the distinction between income from active and passive
business becomes crucial, for by operation of section 91 (1), the taxpayer's
pro rata share of the foreign accrual property income is included in his tax-
able income regardless of whether such income was distributed or distribut-
able in that year.60
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE ACTIVE
BUSINESS PROVISIONS
The problems which arise in drafting legislation for domestic and extra-
territorial corporations are in substance the same, differing only in degree. In
both cases the issue is whether accumulation of profits in the corporation
ought to be encouraged or deterred. Where the corporation operates extra-
territorially, there is an added dimension to the fact of accumulation; Canada
lacks ordinary jurisdiction to tax nonresidents on extraterritorial sources. How-
ever, this added dimension serves only to heighten the effects of the deferral
which ordinarily results from the interposition of the corporate form.
57 Defined in Regulations section 5907(1) (d), "exempt surplus" consists of active
business income net of local taxes for the post-1975 period, net incomes from 1972
through 1975 and certain capital gains.
58 If an entity is not a controlled foreign affiliate, then FAPI is allocated to the
affiliate's taxable surplus and dividends paid out of that account are taxable, with a
credit for underlying foreign taxes, when received. See section 113(1) (b).
59 A controlled foreign affiliate is a foreign affiliate as defined in section 95(1) (d)
which meets the tests described in section 95(1) (a).
00 For further information on the mechanics and objects of the foreign affiliate
rules, see generally A. Scace, The Income Tax Law of Canada (3d ed. Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1976) at 670-750; see also R. Brown, Foreign Affiliates
-Surplus Accounts and Reorganization Provisions (1975), 27 Conf. Rep. 859; R. Dart,
The Foreign Affiliate Regulations (1976), 28 Conf. Rep. 104; J. Hausman, The Tax
Implications of Controlled Foreign Affiliates Under the FAPI Rules (1975), 27 Conf.
Rep. 850; J. Hausman, Canadds New Tax Treaties (1976), 28 Conf. Rep. 319; Steiss
and Dart, The Foreign Affiliate (1976), 24 Can. Tax J. 241.
1978]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The policy question of what a domestic corporation should or may do
with its surpluses is open to numerous resolutions because each element of the
transaction is within the jurisdiction and subject to legislative fiat. Thus the
issue of tax avoidance is a peripheral consideration in designing appropriate
tax legislation. Where the corporation is nonresident, there is also a desire
to manipulate taxpayer treatment of surpluses, but here tax avoidance by use
of corporations which are outside the reach of the sovereign, is of central
importance. With this rough characterization of the overall problem in mind,
it is interesting to explore the policy considerations that led to the implemen-
tation of sections 125, 129 and 95 in the 1972 Act. This inquiry can be
reduced to four steps: (1) what unique purpose did the legislature intend to
achieve with the provision in question; (2) whether those objectives are pro-
perly conceived; (3) whether the formulation of the statute is consistent with
those objectives; and (4) whether the provision is drafted in language that
minimizes misinterpretation and misapplication by bureaucrats, taxpayers,
administrative tribunals and courts.
Part I of this article set out the avowed purpose for which the section
125 "incentive" was introduced. 61 If the various politicians and interested
observers are to be taken at face value, the small business deduction was de-
signed to achieve the following purposes:
(1) To enable small and new business to finance growth with retained earnings.(2) To lower entry barriers for small and new businesses in capital intensive
industries.
(3) To provide some means of compensating for the relative inefficiency of small
firms, such inefficiency being one cause of large firm dominance.
The proponents of an effective lower rate of tax for small business corpora-
tions did not base their recommendations and predictions on empirical evi-
dence which would tend to support their positions, nor did they found the
desirability of such outcomes on econometric models or informed judgment.
Lack of opposition to those unproven propositions may be due to the North
American tradition of treating incorporated small businesses to a lower rate
of tax. 2
The unique purposes to be achieved by the implementation of the FAPI
rules are much more believable and measurable-to curtail the use of non-
resident corporations to shelter accumulations of income over which Canada
has no jurisdiction, while at the same time retaining the tax benefits which
flow from "normal" tax jurisdiction in respect of income from bona fide
business operations.
61 Whether the small business tax credit is properly referred to as an incentive is
open to debate. Depending on one's ideology, the preferred rate may be termed an
indirect subsidy, a concession, booty or pillage. The term is not used here either as a
term of art or as an indicator of the writer's personal opinion. For a condensed version
of the debate over the rhetoric of tax policy, see B. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes"
and Political Rhetoric (1973), 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1099.
62 In the United States, all corporations are exempt from the surtax on taxable
income on the first $25,000 of taxable income, regardless of source: Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, s. 11(d), limited by s. 1551. In Canada, the split rate was introduced
in 1948.
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A. Validity of the Purposes
The issue of whether a particular policy objective is properly conceived
is the chief difficulty in any analysis of tax legislation. It is clear that provi-
sions such as section 125 can have unattainable objectives, and that even
after a particular goal is reached it will have no impact on the economy. For
example, even if it is assumed that the small business credit does accelerate
reinvestment, lower entry barriers in capital intensive industries and offset
small firm inefficiency, thereby redressing the dominance of large firms, there
is no guarantee that the productive output of Canada will be affected.
As well, there is no evidence to support the assertion that those benefits
will necessarily flow from any device designed to achieve such a purpose.
Because there is a shortage of research data upon which to base an
evaluation of the legislative intent behind provisions such as section 125, and
because economists and government financiers eschew even an estimate of the
tax expenditure created by section 125, hardheaded criticism of the validity or
propriety of its objects is impossible. This observation is made with a note
of despair, for until tax legislation is scrutinized with the same skepticism
accorded an expenditure budget, pointless preferential treatment with no ob-
servable effect on Canada as an economic unit will continue to be accepted
either because it looks like a bright idea or because the magnitude of its im-
pact is not appreciated.
In the absence of observable evidence that links legislative intent and
economic phenomena, the scope of criticism of tax policy narrows radically.
All that remains is to measure the proposed or existing legislation against
various alternatives, in order to determine whether the best route to the ob-jective has been taken (although lack of evidence again is a handicap), and
to weigh the effects of the drafting against the initial objectives.
13. Alternate Methods of Assisting Small Business
One useful way of assessing the device selected-in terms of type of
legislation and the substantive conditions attached to its application-is to
extract the operative conditions from the legislation and to examine their
effect if a device other than a tax incentive of the nature proposed had been
employed to achieve the same social or economic objectives.es Reading sec-
tions 125 and 129 together, the following preconditions to governmental
assistance emerge:
(1) The taxpayer must be incorporated in order to receive assistance.
(2) The taxpayer must be Canadian controlled.
6 3 The analytic approach is set out in P. McDaniel and A. Raplinsky, The Use of
the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in
Tax Expenditures (1971), 12 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 351. It is adapted to the
case of the small business credit as well as possible in the absence of tax expenditures
data. For want of data, the writer has drawn some very tentative conclusions as to the
tax benefit to small business under section 125. These conclusions are based on Canada,
Statistics Canada, Corporations and Labor Unions Returns Act, Part I (Catalogue
61-210, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974) [hereinafter CALURA-Corporations].
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(3) The taxpayer may not have retained more than $750,000 of net business profits
since 1971 (referred to as the "cumulative deduction account").
(4) The taxpayer may reduce the cumulative deduction account by paying divi-
dends to shareholders.
(5) The taxpayer is eligible for assistance of up to $31,500 each year, depending
on the level of net business income.
This is not a precise rendering of the terms and mechanism of the small
business credit, but it is adequate to highlight the main features of the legisla-
tion: only corporations which have retained earnings of less than $750,000
since 1971 are deemed to require assistance, and a maximum of $31,500 may
be awarded in each year of eligibility.ss Eligibility, however, may be retained
indefinitely by a regular pattern of distributions.
Because there is no limit on the total tax benefit which is available to
each eligible taxpayer or to the class of eligible taxpayers as a whole under
the terms of section 125, it becomes especially difficult to predict the magni-
tude of funding or concessions required to achieve the same result through
alternative methods. It is possible to come up with a ballpark estimate of the
annual cost of the credit, assuming that the cost is approximately twenty-five
percent of the taxable business income of corporations which meet the general
guidelines set out above. CALURA figures indicate that the magnitude of the
tax credit could be somewhere in the $100 million range in 1974, although this
can be taken as a very rough figure at best.
6 5
While it does not seem too invidious to leave an extra $100 million in
the hands of deserving small businessmen each year, the hidden effects of
section 125 become clearer when its terms are recast in the form of legislation
giving a direct subsidy to small business corporations. Such legislation would
take the following form if it were to achieve the same effect as section 125:
64 These figures do not apply for each year since 1971; the 1972 credit was limited
to 23% of $50,000, and the amount has been increased gradually to its present level.
65 According to CALURA-Corporations (1974), supra note 63, there were some
200,000 corporations in 1974. (Note that this figure is inconsistent with the figure of
258,501 corporations in 1973 reported in Canadian Tax Foundation, The National Finances
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1977) at 73.) For the purposes of CALURA-
Corporations, all corporations were separated into three categories: reporting foreign con-
trolled, reporting Canadian controlled and unclassified. Reporting corporations have more
than $250,000 in assets or $500,000 in sales. Twenty-five percent of all corporations arc
reporting corporations and they account for 95% of all taxable corporate profits. The
unclassified corporations had average profits of $5500 and average assets of $70,000.
23% of the total profits of unclassified corporations-the amount of the small business
credit-was $175 million for 1974, $148 million for 1973. CALURA-Corporations
indicates at 19 that of the 138,500 unclassified corporations in 1974, some 3000 are
foreign controlled, which would of course disqualify them from taking the small business
credit. As well, not all corporations which fall into the unclassified category would
necessarily qualify for the credit, nor are all reporting Canadian corporations neces-
sarily disqualified from obtaining the credit.
Looking at the figures from another point of view, if all of the 135,000 Canadian
controlled unclassified corporations had qualified for the maximum 1974 credit of
$12,500 per corporation, the revenue cost could have been as high as $1552 million-
almost ten times the amount that was likely to have been claimed. Greater accuracy
will be possible with more detailed statistics. For the purpose of discussion, an actual
credit of $100 million in 1974 will be assumed.
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The federal government will pay tax exempt subsidies to Canadian controlled
corporations under the following circumstances:
(1) The small business subsidy is available to corporations only.
(2) The amount of the subsidy will vary according to the amount of the corpora-
tion's net taxable business income each year:
net business income subsidy
$150,000 or more $31,500
100,000 21,000
50,000 10,500
10,000 2,100
-nfl- -nil-
(loss) -nil-
(3) Corporations which reinvest business income in business assets will be disquali-
fied from receiving the subsidy as soon as $750,000 of business income earned
since 1971 has been reinvested.
(4) Corporations which reinvest business profits earned since 1971 to the extent of
$600,000 only and which then pass all subsequent profits on to shareholders
as dividends or to officers as salaries will continue to be eligible for the full
amount of the subsidy for an indefinite period of time..
(5) Corporations which become highly levered by taking back distributions de-
scribed in paragraph 3 as loans from shareholders remain eligible for con-
tinuing subsidies.
(6) There are no requirements as to the use to which the corporation must put the
subsidy, if any, although it is hoped it will be used to expand the business.
It is hardly doubtful that any legislator would submit such legislation for seri-
ous consideration, which causes one to wonder how section 125 ever found
its way into the Income Tax Act.
It is difficult to recast section 125 into an investment tax credit or rapid
amortization provision, simply because section 125 makes no direct reference
to capital investment. The small business credit is available to a broad spec-
trum of corporations, including those which have virtually no depreciable
capital, and accordingly any tax device intended to promote capital invest-
ment by corporations would benefit only some of the corporations which
enjoy the rebate under section 125. The question presented by the alternative
of investment stimulating devices is whether the economic purpose of a small
business provision is better achieved through intensification of investment or
by a generalized tax reduction as offered by section 125. The Carter Report
originally proposed a rapid writeoff, and when that proposal was rejected,
there was no substantive discussion of the differences between the two devices.
If the government were willing to forego the notional $100 million of
revenue represented by the small business credit, but were willing to do so
only through an investment tax credit, then some interesting comparisons may
be made. Assume that the government were willing to forego $100 million in
annual revenue or up to $11,500 in revenue from each of 135,000 qualifying
corporations, and that it wanted to increase the rate of capital investment
from the 1973 figure of 6.5 percent for unclassified corporations to ten percent
for 1974. If desired investment levels were reached, then the $100 million
would be consumed by a general ten percent credit, or by a thirty percent tax
credit on any investment in excess of levels achieved the year before, up to
a total expenditure by qualifying corporations of some $340 million. That is,
for its $100 million investment credit, the government would receive an addi-
tional $340 million in capital investment over the "normal" level.
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Imposing the structure of section 125 on this enriched investment tax
credit yields some strange results. A corporation with income of $50,000 or
more (using the 1973 version of the small business credit) would be able to
take advantage of the full $11,500 credit. But if such a corporation exceeded
the expenditure required to generate the full $11,500 credit, no further benefit
would follow. Depending on whether the ten percent or thirty percent approach
were selected, a corporation would be limited in terms of the total available
credit not only by the amount of its total income, but also by previous invest-
ments. If a corporation has used up its total business limit by permitting the
cumulative deduction account to mount up (which will happen with reinvest-
ment), then no capital expenditure will give rise to an investment credit. At
the other extreme, corporations which are in a loss or low income position
will receive little or no recognition for capital expenditure as well. Only cor-
porations near the top of the eligibility scale or those which borrow on dis-
tributions would qualify for the full benefit of the credit, again achieving
inequitable results for aggressively growing corporations and corporations
which are experiencing temporary losses.
Under any other scheme, the inequities would persist so long as the eligi-
bility requirements of section 125 were continued. 66 Insofar as those require-
ments blatantly favor the nongrowth firm, or the corporation that indulges
in thin capitalization, the small business credit or any similarly structured
alternative fails to achieve the purposes it is said to have been designed to
achieve. The problem, of course, lies in Parliament's conception of appro-
priate eligibility requirements. Whether the goal is increasing the after tax
earnings of qualifying corporations generally, or stimulating all or some
capital investment, the cumulative deduction account-total business limit
device must be modified. Either the tax impact of leaving the credit behind
should be mitigated, perhaps by a species of notch provision, or the salary/
dividend bail out and thin capitalization response of some taxpayers ought
to be regulated. An incentive to economic growth is buried in section 125,
but it is offset by too powerful a disincentive in the same provision.
C. Administrative Feasibility
It is unfortunate that in trying to establish a growth incentive for small
business, Parliament ended up implementing a provision guaranteed to in-
crease the number of tax-motivated incorporations and to petrify a segment
of the corporate population in midgrowth. Moreover, the Act stated that the
small business deduction was to be applied to the "active business income" of
corporations, even though it is intuitively obvious to the most casual observer
that "active business" is one of those elusive terms that is continually litigated
and never elucidated.67
66 Devices such as guaranteed unsecured loans, low interest or interest free loans,
if subject to the same eligibility criterion as section 125, would have the same "upside
down" effect of direct subsidies or investment credits, as discussed. Modifications of the
law regulating market structure, if designed to achieve the same effect as section 125,
would be read as biased against small aggressive businesses.
67 If the mass of litigation that arose under section 68 of the 1952 Act was not
enough to convince the draftsman of the difficulties associated with the use of that term,
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The "active business' distinction as used in both section 125 and section
95 is intended to winnow out a special class of business receipts for unique
treatment. Under section 125 that unique treatment is a reduced rate of tax in
some circumstances, under section 95 it is exemption from the deemed distri-
butions provisions of the foreign affiliate rules. Although it would be con-
venient to equate "active business" with some generally understood concept
such as "bona fide business undertaking" or "carrying on business," 68 to do so
would be to ignore the complex breakdown of sources which may be derived
from a close reading of the respective sections. These breakdowns demonstrate
that "active business" must mean something less than business in the ordinary
sense if the integrity of the language employed in each scheme is to be retained:
Incomes of a foreign affiliate:
(1) Investment income
(a) taxable capital gains
(b) certain income from services
(c) income from property that is not incident to the conduct of an active
business
(d) income from property that amounts to income from business other than an
active business
(e) income from business other than an active business that is not incident to
the conduct of an active business
(2) Business income
(a) income from property that is incident to the conduct of an active business
Cb) income from business other than active business that is incident to the
conduct of an active business
(c) income from property that amounts to income from business and income
from active business
(d) income from business that amounts to income from active business
Incomes of a Canadian controlled private corporation:
(1) Investment income
(a) taxable capital gains
Cb) income from property other than a property held or used by the corpora-
tion "in the course of carrying on a business"
(c) income from property that amounts to income from business but not in-
come from an active business carried on in Canada
(d) income from a business other than an active business carried on in Canada
(2) Business income
(a) income from property used or held by the corporation "in the course of
carrying on a business"
Cb) income from property that amounts to income from business and income
from active business carried on in Canada
(c) income from business that amounts to income from an active business
carried on in Canada
Legislation which employs language for which there are no easy referents
invites litigation and spawns that type of uncertainty which taxpayers abhor.
heed could have been taken of the American experience. For a collection of the leading
cases and articles, see R. Albrecht, Application of the Active Business Requirement to
the Tax-Free Spin-Off of Corporate Real Estate (1976), 3 Pepperdine L. Rev. 221.
68 This is not to suggest that "carrying on business" itself is not fraught with diffi-
culty. See Tara Exploration and Development Co. v. MNR, 70 D.T.C. 6370 (Ex. Ct.),
aff'd on other grounds 72 D.T.C. 6288 (S.C.C.); cf. Birmount Holdings Ltd. v. MNR,
77 D.T.C. 5031 (F.C.T.D.). In any event, that suggestion may be spurious in light of the
fact that section 125(1) (a) refers to "active business carried on in Canada.' whereas
section 95 uses the unadorned expression "active business."
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Part I of this article is devoted to an examination of the struggle to
define active business in the context of section 125.
Some of the issues which have arisen in the attempt to define "active
business" simply cannot be resolved by the interpretation of that term: whether
all types of business operations should be eligible for the credit, whether
property operations should be treated any differently than so-called commer-
cial activities, and whether a corporation may maintain eligibility while ac-
tually conducting its operations through an independent contractor such as
a management firm. Yet the courts ultimately have been forced to consider
such questions when determining whether an undertaking constitutes an "ac-
tive business" for purposes of section 125.
Ill. THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF ACTIVE BUSINESS
While a policy analysis of provisions which employ the "active business"
device centres on the appropriateness of discriminating between different types
of corporate business income, a legal analysis focuses on whether the language
employed to communicate the rule communicates it accurately, and whether
the rule is capable of being applied in an even-handed manner by administra-
tors and judges. The analysis of these points should be treated as an interim
report on the development of active business because only two cases 0 are
appellate decisions, and one of the administrative rulings7 0 is under appeal
at present. The concept is not yet settled, although its outline is emerging. 71
Given the pre-existing dichotomy between business and property as
sources of income under the Income Tax Act, it is not surprising that con-
fusion attends the demarcation of "active business." In the scheme for taxing
both small businesses and controlled foreign affiliates, the terms "active busi-
ness," "property" and "business" are used in a manner which requires separate
meanings for each term.72 Thus it would appear to be necessary to draw a
distinction not only between active business and property, but also between
active business and business. This three-way distinction being necessary, it
then becomes necessary to identify the relationships between property, on the
one hand, and business or active business on the other hand. The traditional
approaches to statutory construction are of little assistance. 73 As interpretive
69 MRT Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 76 D.T.C. 6158 per Jackett C.J. (F.C.A.)
afl'g 75 D.T.C. 5224; The Queen v. Cadboro Bay Holdings Ltd., 77 D.T.C. 5115 per
Gibson I. (F.C.T.D.).
70 Marlee investments Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 153 (T.R.B.). Taxpayers recently
discontinued appeals from two Tax Appeal Board rulings: DSBK Management Ltd. v.
MNR, 75 D.T.C. 219 (T.A.B.) and L&F Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 150 (T.A.B.).
71 For earlier discussions of the concept of active business, see Qu'est-ce qu'une
entreprise "exploitee activement"? (1972), 2 Interlex 16-20; C. Boulanger, La notion
d'exploitation active d'une entreprise de l'alinea 125(1)(a) de la lol canadienne de l'inpOt
sur le revenue (1972), 3 Revue Generale de Droit 7-56; G. Covert, Update of Basic
Tax Concepts-Carrying on an Active Business in Canada (1976), 28 Conf. Rep. 572;
D. Sherbaniuk, Current Corporate Tax Problems-Active Business Income (1972), 24
Conf. Rep. 82.
72 See text, supra at 55.
73 See, e.g., MRT Investments Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 5224 at 5231-34 per Walsh
J. (F.C.T.D.).
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tools, they are too broadly stated, and simply did not develop in order to dis-
criminate between different types and forms of businesses. However, an under-
standing of the underlying rationale for sections 125, 129 and 95 does suggest
two approaches to determining the scope of active business. The first approach
might be termed a functional theory of active business, the second a policy
approach. A third approach, a variety of the literal approach, has also emerged.
The functional theory looks not just to the operation of section 125
(or 95) as controlling the definition of active business, but also takes account
of its interaction with section 129. The combined effect of these two sections
is to integrate personal and corporate taxation of "Canadian investment in-
comes" 74 while providing an incentive to incorporated businesses in the form
of a reduced rate of tax on income from bona fide business undertakings. The
function of the phrases "income from property," "income from business other
than an active business" and "income from active business" must be seen as
setting up the basic distinction between business and investment income which
is required by the two sections. Income from property, and business other
than an active business is treated as investment income by section 129; if a
receipt does not fall into one of those two categories, then the scheme set up
for Canadian controlled private corporations mandates that it be classed as
income from active business-there is no third alternative.
When a functional approach is used, one would expect that the distinc-
tion drawn between business other than an active business or property, on the
one hand, and active business, on the other hand, would approximate closely
the distinction drawn between business and investment income in general tax
law. With some modifications, this trend is evident in decisions under section
125.
A policy approach to defining active business also has some utility,
especially when used in conjunction with the functional theory. It is no secret
that when sections 125 and 129 were proposed, the scheme was to have been
complemented by a tax on "ineligible investments" 75 which would negate the
section 125 benefit insofar as it was applied to the purchase of investment
property which did not generate income from active business. From the orig-
inal proposal it can be deduced that "active business" was intended to have
been construed narrowly; with the repeal of the limiting legislation, it can be
argued that the original parliamentary intent continued unabated. This ap-
proach has been rejected, but something of the belief that not all types of
businesses should qualify for the tax credit lingers on, for it is frequently
argued that certain service operations, for example, or adventures in the na-
ture of trade, should be excluded from the concept of active business, as Par-
liament did not intend to provide them with an "incentive." The obvious
flaw in this reasoning is that such sources would then have to be treated as
investments, and it is difficult to contemplate services or adventures as a
74Defined in section 129(4) (a).
75 See MRT Investments Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 5224 at 5232-33. The term is
defined in section 189(4) (b) of the 1972 Act, now repealed, and included enumerated
forms of investment as well as any property not used to produce income from an active
business.
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species of investment, especially when tax legislation was deliberately amended
to bring the latter into business income.76
A third approach which can be and has been invoked in defining "active
business" is more traditional than the first two. A straightforward application
of the literal approach, the "activities test" merely seeks to imbue the modi-
fier "active" with some meaning independent of "business," and does so by
measuring the level of activity required to produce the income in question.
This approach, like the others, is considered only when the income in question
arises from a property operation, the type of business that has generated the
most litigation under section 125 and raises the most doubt under section
95 as well.
Before grappling with the acceptance of any of these approaches in the
decided cases, it is necessary to look briefly at two problems which arise in
making distinctions between investment and business income. The first is
whether the effect of incorporation will operate to establish any presumption
that corporate receipts are income from an active business as well as income
from business in the ordinary sense. The second is whether the legal relation
between the "operating party"77 and the corporation will have any influence
on the classification of income from business, regardless of whether the "busi-
ness" is an ordinary business operation or a property operation which is treat-
ed as a business.
This section will deal with these issues from the perspective of the de-
cided cases on point, all of which arose in connection with the small business
deduction. Further authority is provided by decisions under the former per-
sonal corporation provision, although they are relied upon only to augment
the decisional law relating to the present active business provisions. It is pos-
sible to go even further afield and take note of the myriad American cases
dealing with active business in corporate tax law as well, but it is believed
that this undertaking would be only marginally productive in light of the array
of statutory provisions in which the phrase is used.78 Once one accedes to the
proposition that legislative purpose and intended effect are valuable aids in
the construction of technically complex statutes, it becomes difficult to justify
the demand that a particular word or phrase have static meaning despite
varying context. Even legislation aimed generally at abuse of the holding com-
pany concept-such as sections 95 and 125, in part-does not a priori dictate
a uniform construction of "active business" as used in such provisions, for
the simple reason that what might be impermissible and abusive taxpayer be-
havior in relation to the purpose sought to be achieved by one provision might
be perfectly acceptable in light of the objects of another provision.
76 See the definition of "business" in section 248 (1).
77This concept is borrowed from the regime governing the taxation of natural
resources in the United States and Canada. "Operating party" refers to the party which
is clearly conducting a business of carrying out certain kinds of operations; "nonoperat-
ing interest" represents a mere investment interest.
78 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, sections 346, 355, 542(c), 542(d),
543(a), 921 and 954(c), all of which employ the active business technique in discrimi-
nating sources of income, and all of which have generated considerable litigation over
the term.
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A. The Effect of Incorporation
In a very recent decision, Mr. Justice Cattanach observed that "the incor-
poration of a company merely raises a presumption of an intention to carry on
business as outlined in the memorandum but this presumption may be rebut-
ted and accordingly is not conclusive. 79 This rebuttable presumption is a
familiar feature of income tax jurisprudence.8 0 Although it has its roots in a
questionable analogy,8' it is routinely invoked where a corporation-frequently
a holding company-earns income from "property" in the narrow sense in
which that term is used in sections 3 and 9.82 Reliance on the fact of incor-
poration as a reason for finding that a corporation is carrying on a business
is often found where there is no particularly compelling substantive reason to
find that the undertaking in question is a business, but where no grave in-
justice would flow from such a result. The presumption that a corporation
carries on business can compensate for otherwise weak evidence.
Because the doctrine of incorporation has such vague application, it is
especially troublesome to gauge the nature of the evidence required to rebut
7 9 Hillsdale Shopping Centre Ltd. v. MNR, 77 D.T.C. 5256 at 5257 per Cattanach
J. (F.C.T.D.).
80 See I. Hannan and A. Farnsworth, The Principles of income Taxation (London:
Stevens & Son, 1952) at 155.81 Lord Sterndale gave life to the presumption with this justification in IRC v.
Korean Syndicate Ltd., [1921] 3 K.B. 258 at 273 (C.A.):
I do not think it would have been at all clear, if the Syndicate were an individual,
that he was not carrying on a business; and for this reason. You would have to
see what he was doing and why he was doing it, and if he was doing it, and if
he was doing it under the circumstances in which the Syndicate was doing it-
namely, trying to attain the object of acquiring a concession and turning the same
to account-then, I think he might very well be carrying on a business. I do not
admit either, that there can be no difference for this purpose once you get the
individual and the company spending money on the same basis, then there would
be no difference between them at all. But the fact that the limited company comes
into existence in a different way from that in which an individual comes into
existence is a matter to be considered. An individual comes into existence for
many purposes, or perhaps for none, whereas a limited company comes into
existence for some particular purpose, and if it comes into existence for the
particular purpose of carrying out a transaction by obtaining concessions and
turning them to account, then that is a matter to be considered when you come
to decide whether doing that is carrying on a business or not.
See also Anderson Logging Co. v. The King, 52 D.T.C. 1209, aff'd 52 D.T.C. 1215 (P.C.);
Sutton Lumber and Trading Co. v. MNR, 53 D.T.C. 1158 (S.C.C.); Western Leaseholds
Ltd. v. MNR, 59 D.T.C. 1316 (S.C.C.); cf. Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. MNR, 62 D.T.C.
1131 (S.C.C.); Canada Permanent Mortgage Corp. v. MNR, 71 D.T.C. 5409 (F.C.T.D.).
82 Even though "property" is defined very broadly in section 248(1), it cannot have
the same broad meaning when used in the source formula "income from business or
property" because all property which could also be classed as "business" would be taken
out of the set "property." To put the proposition another way, income from property
excludes income from business even though the concept of property includes business
in other contexts in the Act. As the hallmarks of business are personal exertion, ex-
pertise and risk, it can be appreciated that the notion of income from property subsumes
only income-producing property (a) that is not a business and (b) does not require
the personal exertions of the owner to generate the income. See, e.g., Hollinger v. MNR,
73 D.T.C. 5003 (F.C.T.D.), 74 D.T.C. 6604 (F.C.A.), for a suggestion of this descrip-
tion of income from property.
19781
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the presumption. Where the corporation in question is a personal holding
company, the issue becomes especially difficult because of the nature of such
cases. Although taxpayer fraud is the exception in such instances, there are
evidentiary problems in the ordinary case which arise from the corporation or
shareholder's natural impulse to paint as favourable a picture as possible. At
some point, however, the presumption is rebutted and then the determination
of whether income is from business or property proceeds according to a deter-
mination of the substance of the operation. Many of the substantive tests em-
ployed are those applied to individual taxpayers who earn income from
property in the course of what is alleged to be business.
The implications of the doctrine of incorporation to the problem of
defining active business are obvious. If a corporation can be said to be carry-
ing on business simply because it is incorporated, then it is plausible to class
as "other than active business" those property operations which are nudged
into the "business" category chiefly because they are conducted by a corpora-
tion, reserving classification as "active business" for operations which are not
property operations. If this reading of sections 95, 125 and 129 is accepted,
then the schemes governing domestic and nonresident close corporations were
formulated in light of an expectation that the effect of incorporation would
operate to class all receipts as business income.
If it is not accepted that sections 95, 125 and 129 were structured with
the effect of incorporation in mind, then it is more difficult to identify the
referents for the terms "other than active business" and "active business"
without doing violence to the language. If "other than active business" is not
meant to create an irrebutable presumption that property operations are in-
vestment operations in the hands of a corporation, then business in the ordi-
nary sense has been subdivided into "other than active business" and "active
business" on some other basis, perhaps the level of "activity" surrounding
the production of profits. If that is the case, then the inherent redundance of
"active business" is troublesome.83
The effect of incorporation has received minimal direct attention in the
section 125(1) cases, but a great deal can be gleaned from inference. The
conclusion one must reach is that the effect of incorporation is firmly estab-
lished in judicial thought processes, sections 125 and 95 memorialize the doc-
trine with the trifurcation of sources into "property," "other than active
business" and "active business," and alleged holding companies will be treated
no differently than any other corporation. For example, in MRT Investments
Ltd. v. The Queen,8s Mr. Justice Walsh expressly considered the fact that the
taxpayer was a corporation in classifying its sources of income taking the point
of view that if a public or private corporation carries on the business for
which it is formed it creates a presumption that the profit from these activities
is a profit derived from the business. Even when the effect of incorporation is
8 3 Without the doctrine of the effect of incorporation, there would be no need to
divide corporate income-earning operations into "business" and "active business." The
ordinary business category is required to catch property operations, which are not "real"
or "active" business according to the draftsman.
84 75 D.T.C. 5224 (F.C.T.D.).
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coupled with the "time, attention and labor" test of business, it is still an influ-
ential factor and necessitates the use of some other test for "active business."
Walsh J.'s analysis was not criticized in The Queen v. Rockmore Invest-
ments Ltd.,85 although Chief Justice Jackett did not advert to the effect of
incorporation, but restricted his reasoning to differentiating property, business
and active business as sources.
In a more recent judicial opinion, Mr. Justice Gibson considered the effect
of incorporation in The Queen v. Cadboro Bay Holdings Ltd.:
[Income from "a business other than an active business" must mean income from
a business that is in an "absolute state of suspension";. .. devoid of any quantum
of business activity, but which has some asset which produces income.8 6
This statement reflects a belief that incorporation transforms all corporate
receipts into business receipts. Unless the Supreme Court negatives the effect
of incorporation for small business corporations, the tripartite classification
of sources under section 125 (1) will continue to present conceptual difficulties.
A modification of the property-business-active business approach em-
ployed by Chief Justice Jackett in Rockmore Investments is developed in
Cadboro Bay Holdings. Mr. Justice Gibson agreed that "active" is not intended
to operate to exclude dormant businesses because the section speaks of in-
comes and not sources; a dormant corporation would not have any incomes.
He also agreed that "active" operates "to exclude some business having suffi-
cient activity in the year to give rise to income." He then concluded that there
must exist some "quantum of activity" which qualifies an undertaking as an
active business.87 However, in the interest of "the smooth working of the
system," he held that business is virtually synonymous with active business:
[Any quantum of business activity that gives rise to income in a taxation year for
a private corporation in Canada is sufficient to make mandatory the characteriza-
tion of such income as income from an "active business carried on in Canada."88
He also stated that "business" means any activity which falls within the ex-
tended definition of business in section 248 (1) or within its ordinary meaning,
but that it excludes investments. By recognizing that a corporation can have
investment income, Mr. Justice Gibson denies the full impact of the effect of in-
corporation, and leads the way in reducing it to a less significant role in the
classification of corporate sources of income.
B. Who May "Act" for the Corporation
Corporations may derive income from a source that is an active business
directly or indirectly, as owners, joint venturers or partners, under agreements
containing a vast array of provisions. The issue which arises under sections
125, 129 and 95 is whether the degree and quality of the corporation's interest
in the source, the active business, has any effect on classification of the income
in the corporation's hands. The predominant forms of interest in an actiui
85 76 D.T.C. 6156 (F.C.A.).
86 77 D.T.C. 5115 at 5122 per Gibson J. (F.C.T.D.).
87 77 D.T.C. at 5123.
88 d.
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business that a corporation would ordinarily hold include the following: (1)
ownership of all interests, managed by employees, officers or independent
contractors; (2) ownership of all interests except a bare operating economic
interest held by a management firm, for example; (3) an interest in a partner-
ship, joint venture or syndicate that conducts an active business; (4) an eco-
nomic interest only, either operating or nonoperating; (5) an interest in a
trust or (6) shares in another corporation which has an active business.
Scant attention has been paid to these issues. 89 This is unfortunate, be-
cause choice of the wrong "actor" can turn active business into "passive
business" when proper planning would ensure the desired tax result. The
contrary is true as well for those who would prefer to receive the section 129
refundable dividend taxes rather than take advantage of the small business
credit. Because only a few of the section 125(1) cases have touched on the
relational aspects of income from an active business,90 recourse must be had
to some of the common law principles relating to business in the ordinary
sense. If Gibson J.'s suggestion that business and active business are synonyms
is accepted, there should be no objection to transferring those principles to this
statutory context.
1. Ownership and Operating Control
Where the owner of a business operates it through persons over whom
it has the legal right and potentiality to control-even if it is never exercised
-then the general rule is that the "activity" of the actors, be they servants
or independent contractors, will be imputed to the owner of the business. This
proposition flows directly from common law principles."" However, in dealing
with the effect of independent management on an active business, the courts
have stumbled around a little in reaching a position on the effect of indepen-
dent management.
The decision-makers went astray in the first cases, in Centennial Shopping
Ltd. v. MNR92 and ESG Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 3 in which the interposition
of a management firm was held to preclude characterization of the income as
deriving from an active business. Mr. Prociuk's reason for denying the credit
in Centennial was simply that the management firm was not subject to the
taxpayer's direction from day to day. The error in ESG Holdings was com-
pounded when Mr. Justice Walsh of the Federal Court concluded that if it were
not for the fact that the corporation's business was actually conducted by an
89 See N. Dickson, Income-Does the Source Flow Through (1977), CCH Provin-
cial Inheritance & Gift Tax Reports, paragraph 20,033; H. Kellough, The Business of
Defining a Partnership Under the Income Tax Act (1974), 22 Can. Tax J. 190 at 206-08.
9o ESG Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 5224 per Walsh J. (F.C.T.D.) rev'd 76
D.T.C. 6158 per Jackett C.3. (F.C.A.); DSBK Management Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 219
(T.R.B.); Centennial Shopping Centre Ltd. v. MNR, 74 D.T.C. 1190 (T.R.B.).
91 See H. Plaxton, Canadian Income Tax Law (2d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1947) at
214-15, n. 9, 1. See also Shorrt v. MNR, 60 D.T.C. 1056 per Thurlow J. (Ex. Ct.);
No. 439 v. MNR, 57 D.T.C. 401 (T.A.B.); Parisien v. MNR, 51 D.T.C. 349 (T.A.B.).
92 74 D.T.C. 1190 (T.R.B.).
93 75 D.T.C. 5224 per Walsh J. (F.C.T.D.) rev'd 76 D.T.C. 6158 per Jackett C.J.
(F.C.A.).
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independent contractor who received a fixed fee, the corporation would be
entitled to compute its tax liability under section 125(1).
The misunderstanding was corrected by Chief Justice Jackett, who held
that ESG Holdings was in no way disqualified by its use of a management
ffirm:94
With respect, I do not agree that there is any material difference in principle, in
so far as the carrying on of an active business by a corporation is concerned,
between carrying it on through the agency of officers or servants of the corpora-
tion and carrying it on through the agency of an independent contractor.95
The Chief Justice does not give any reasons for his conclusions, but it is
apparent that there are several influential factors which support it. First, it
may be said that the mere retention of an independent contractor is strong
evidence that the operation with which he is charged is a business or an active
business.06 Second, use of an independent management firm is an acceptable
commercial practice, limited only by the directors' duty to retain control over
policy matters,97 and differs in principle from the employment of servants only
by degree. Third, so long as the directors fulfill their legal duty to manage
the corporation, the "direction and control" concept would be irrelevant in
determining whether employees and independent contractors should be treated
differently.98
Where a management arrangement is a sham, or the directors have abro-
gated their statutory duties by contract or impermissibly fettered their dis-
cretion, the treatment of the agency relation becomes inextricably bound up
with the purposes and perceived limits of the active business formula. In such
cases, the factual evidence may well tend to establish that the corporation
itself is not operating a business even to the extent implied by supervision by
an active board. It is questionable, however, that the subjective test-the
04 76 D.T.C. at 6159.
95 Cf. Tsuda Canada Ltd. v. MNR, 76 D.T.C. 1010 (T.R.B.), in which it was held
that use of an independent contractor for processing lumber rendered the corporation
ineligible for manufacturing and processing incentives because the relevant statutory
provision stipulated that the operations be carried on "by it". The narrow reading given
"by it" is justifiable; where there are no words of limitation, however, an independent
contractor is as good as the taxpayer.
90 The difficulty with this position is that the attributes of the relationship might
render the owner of the property in question a mere investor if the owner has no skill,
knowledge, expertise or involvement in the operation.
9 7 Corporate legislation envisions limited delegation of authority by the directors to
other parties. See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, ss. 110,
117; The Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53 as amended, ss. 132, 133, 144, in
which the directors are charged with a duty to "manage" or "supervise' the business of
the corporation.
98 As long as the directors retain control over matters of policy, a management
contract per se should not represent an abrogation of that duty. But see Kennerson v.
Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P. 2d 823 (1953); Cullen v.
Governor Clinton Co., 279 App. Div. 483, 110 N.Y. 2d 614 (1952), reproduced in
lacobucci, Beck, Grover and Johnson, Cases and Materials on Corporations (2d ed.
Downsview: Osgoode Hall, 1976) at 6-30 if., which suggest limits on the extent which
the directors may fetter their discretion by means of a management contract. See also
cases collected in W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations (4th unabridged ed.
Mineola: Foundation Press, 1979) at 221 if.
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identity of the actors and their relation to the corporation-would override
the ascendant objective test, which looks to whether the operation itself is a
qualifying business. For the purpose of sections 125 and 129, the courts may
take the position that any relation that does not fall afoul of the associated
corporations rules or the deeming rules will support the application of those
provisions. To the extent that the more usual relation will be some form of
agency, such an approach would be consistent with the purpose of the legis-
lation; however, a few unusual issues will present difficulty.
2. Ownership and an Economic Interest
There is substantial authority to support the proposition that mere owner-
ship of property which is used in the conduct of someone else's business,
coupled with an interest in the production or profits from that business, does
not give rise to business income or active business income. Indirect authority
may be found in MNR v. Spooner 9 and many of the cases arising under sec-
tion 12(1) (g). Direct authority is to be found in sharecropping cases, 0 0 in
which owners of farmland who leased their land in exchange for a portion of
the annual crop attempted to establish that they were carrying on business as
a consequence of the relation. In all but one case, 10 ' the contention was rejected.
In Peery Estate Inc. v. MNR'02 and Westphalen v. MNR,10 3 Canadian
farmland was owned by nonresidents and operated by tenants who surren-
dered a share of the produce as rent. The reasoning employed by Mr. Fisher
in Peery Estate Inc. is reproduced in Westphalen, and centered on three as-
pects of the facts: (1) the nature of the relationship between the taxpayer
and the occupier of the premises, (2) the nature of the taxpayer's risk in the
operation and (3) the form of payment for use of the land. The form of the
legal relation of landlord and tenant was treated as dispositive in character-
izing the receipts as rentals in Peery Estate Inc. However, Mr. Fisher did
indicate that had counsel made submissions regarding the effect of the form
of the payment, he would have considered that factor as well, and he did not
believe that classification of the receipts as rentals followed inexorably from
identification of a landlord and tenant relation.
Mr. Fordham did not display the same precision in Westphalen v. MNR,
where he held that the relation between the owner and farmer was that of
landlord and tenant and therefore that the receipts were rentals or income
from property. This decision reached the proper result but fell into the error
of relying on the formal relationship to classify the receipts instead of con-
sidering it as one bit of evidence which would not necessarily be conclusive
by itself.'0 4
09 1 D.T.C. 211 (S.C.C.), af'd 1 D.T.C. 258 (P.C.).
100 Peery Estate Inc. v. MNR, 52 D.T.C. 202 (T.A.B.); Westphalen v. MNR, 64
D.T.C. 194 (T.A.B.); Holvik v. MNR, 54 D.T.C. 115 (T.A.B.).101 No. 404 v. MNR, 57 D.T.C. 117 (T.A.B.).
102 52 D.T.C. 202 per Fisher (T.A.B.).
103 64 D.T.C. 194 (T.A.B.).
1 0 4 Cf. In re Mulligan, 45 F. Supp. 763 at 766 (Neb. D.C. 1942), in which a standard
form farm lease which was embellished with clauses providing that the owner of the
farm was employing the lessee to operate the farm, in return for 50% of the produce,
was held to constitute a mere lease and not an employment contract. This reasoning
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In all of these cases the board members came ever closer to stating that
the form of the relationship controls classification of receipts as income from
property, business or active business, ignoring risk, control and form of pay-
ment. The result thereby achieved is correct but the reasoning is incorrect.
The better view is that in such an arrangement, where the only formalized
relations concern use of property and division of profits therefrom, the lessor
really holds the estate in the land plus a nonoperating economic interest-a
share of the profits. Consistent with the treatment of other items which con-
veniently fall into the class of nonoperating economic interest, these receipts
are income from property and not from business or active business.
Where a particular relationship involves an economic interest as well as
an independent contractor, it is diffcult to predict whether the income of the
non-operating party will be treated as income from business or investment
property. If the substance of the agreement is a management contract, then
the rule enunciated in ESG Holdings would probably prevail, but if the agree-
ment conferred a large economic interest on the other party in return for con-
sideration other than or in addition to management services, a court should
be able to characterize the receipts as income from property by section
12(1) (g) or common law.'0 5
was reflected in No. 404 v. MNR, 57 D.T.C. 117 (T.A.B.). No. 404 is not a decision one
instinctively trusts, for Mr. Fisher went to the trouble of ruling inadmissible evidence
of a lease agreement between the taxpayer and the "employee" who operated the farm
in exchange for 50% of the crop. With the lease contract out of the way, Mr. Fisher
held that the substance of the relationship was a joint venture because the taxpayer
continually advised the "employee" on various matters. See also Hoivik v. MNR, 54
D.T.C. 113 per Fisher (T.A.B.).
105 Where the taxpayer is incorporated, the point is not without difficulty, due to
the effect of incorporation and the chimerical concept of a "source," CIR v. Korean
Syndicate Ltd., [1921] 3 K.B. 258 (C.A.) held that an eight percent mining royalty was
income from business, notwithstanding that the corporate activity consisted of nothing
more than compliance with statutory formalities, receipt of royalties and payment of
dividends. The relation between the operating and non-operating parties resembled a
lease relation more than a management arrangement.
On substantially similar facts, Hollinger North Shore Exploration Co. v. MNR,
60 D.T.C. 1077 per Thurlow J. (Ex. CL) afld [1963] S.C.R. 131, 63 D.T.C. 1031
per Abbott J. held that $3 million in mining royalties received in consideration for the
sublease of mining property was exempt from taxation as "income derived from the
operation of a mine?' under section 83(5) of the 1952 Act. The Minister had contended
that the "source" of the income was either the sublease or the property right conferred
on the sublessee, and thus the source was not the operation of the mine. Mr. Justice
Thurlow held that the "practical man" would view the operation of the mine as the
source of income, and Mr. Justice Abbott agreed, subject to the slight modification that
the relation was in substance a joint venture. Although the issue of the classification of
the source as business or property did not arise, implicit in the characterization of the
source is the view that the income did not arise from a nonoperating economic interest
(essentially the Minister's argument) and thus was not income from property. By de-
scribing the relation as a joint venture, Mr. Justice Abbott would have been able to treat
the receipts as income from business, and presumably an active business.
The difficulty presented by these two decisions is that on the one hand, such royalties
will be treated as "passive" income, but business income nonetheless, and on the other,
as income from business, and probably active business as well. One resolution of the
conflict thus created would be to let the form of the relation govern: if a "lease" as in
Korean Syndicate, it is passive income; if from a "lease" as in the Hollinger North
Shore Exploration joint venture, it might be income from an active business.
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3. Partnership, Trust, Corporations, etc.
Hollinger v. MNR 0 6 established that the conduct of an active business
through a partnership does not alter the character of the income regardless
of whether the partner is silent or actively engaged in the conduct of the
business. Whether this proposition can be extended to limited partners is diffi-
cult to predict, although the economic interest in such a case would dominate
the relation. 07 On the other hand, where the "investment" is risky, the return
on the investment will be determined by persons over whom the taxpayer has
no control, and such a relation certainly is viewed as a variety of partnership,
the existence of which is contingent on the existence of a business in the or-
dinary sense.' 08 Although Hollinger concerned an individual taxpayer, there
is no reason to expect a different result for corporate partners. 09
Mr. Justice Nodl's reasoning is of general application to the distinction be-
tween business and property income. Counsel for the taxpayer submitted a
fourfold test by which business and property income could be distinguished:
(1) whether the income was the result of efforts made or time and labour devoted
by the taxpayer;(2) whether there was a trading character to the income;
(3) whether the income can be described as income from a business within the
meaning of that term as used in the Act and, finally
(4) the nature and extent of services rendered or activities performed.
Mr. Justice Nol properly rejected the first and last criteria because they were
"subjective," dealing not with the objective attributes of the activity, but
rather with "the person receiving the income." He is clear on two points:
the ultimate "source" of income was business, and classification of receipts as
income from property is a function not of the nature of the relationship be-
tween the owner and the income-producing property, but of the true nature of
the income-producing operation. He utterly rejects the possibility that using
an intermediary other than an agent or independent contractor could trans-
form the source of that income from business into property."10
106 73 D.T.C. 5003 per No~l A.C.J. (F.C.T.D.) afJ'd without written reasons 74
D.T.C. 6604 per Jackett C.I. (F.C.A.).
107 See, e.g., The Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 247, as amended by
S.O. 1973, c. 6, ss. 4, 13(2), 16, in which a limited partner is restricted from participat-
ing in control of the business, and may "advise" as to management only. Cf. Mr. W. v.
MNR, 52 D.T.C. 1150 (Ex. Ct.).
'
0 8 See H. Kellough, The Business of Defining a Partnership under the Income Tax
Act (1974), 22 Can. Tax J. 190 at 196-99.
109 Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 15(1); The Business
Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, as amended, s. 15(2) (4).1 10 Mr. Justice Nohl states in 73 D.T.C. at 5008-09 the converse of the proposition
which is being argued in this section, i.e., that the interposition of an entity of any
character will fail to disturb the nomination of business as a source:
If income from property has any meaning at all, it can only mean the production
of revenue from the use of such property which produces income without the
active and business-like intervention of its owner or someone on his behalf. I have
in mind, for instance, property such as bonds or debentures or real property which
do not require the exertion of much activity or energy in order to produce the
revenue.
Presumably this reasoning would apply where the taxpayer held a business through
the intermediary of an estate or trust as well. See, e.g., Trans-Canada Investment Corp.
v. MNR, 53 D.T.C. 1227, afl'd 55 D.T.C. 1191 at 1193 per Rand J. dissenting (S.C.C.).
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The effect of the interposition of a trust, of course, would be the same as
for a partnership, for "ownership" through a trust implies an interest in the
res, the active business, and not in the trust itself. However, the terms of the
trust could affect the role of the trustees and the rights of the beneficiaries in
the individual properties of the trust to such an extent that the beneficiaries
would hold little more than a mere economic interest. It might be expedient
for a corporation to operate a business through the intermediary of a trust,
and some care should be taken to remain eligible for the small business credit.
C. The Activities Test
None of the three approaches to defining active business mentioned
earlier in this section have received complete acceptance. Nor has any one
approach become immutably associated with a particular form of income.
Where corporate income derives from the rental of real property, rea-
soning tends to vacillate between the activity test and the functional ap-
proach, with Gibson I. as the sole proponent of the latter approach.11' The
activities test developed slowly in successive opinions of the Tax Review Board,
the suggestions having originated in Centennial Shopping Centre Ltd. v.
MNR."12 Mr. Prociuk expressed no doubt that the operation of a small shop-
ping centre was an active business, but reserved the right to ignore the "ac-
tivity" in the face of certain evidence."13 Farlan Investments Ltd. v. MNRI14
gave further support to the activities test when it rejected the notion that a
rental operation could be classified as a business operation automatically,
without any measure of the level of activity required to produce the income.
Smithers Plaza Ltd. v. MNR enunciated the activities test cogently,
placing emphasis on the "question of degree" while warning that "activity"
may not always be what it seems:
In many instances, of course, the difference between income from an investment
and income from a business is not clear-cut. Activities connected with the invest-
ment of capital and the collection of revenue therefrom are often merged with
those activities which could qualify as business operations.'1 5
To complicate matters further, Mr. Cardin also introduced overtones of the
functional test into his analysis of the income from a small shopping centre."16
He noted that if business in the ordinary sense is described as "an income-gen-
erating organization" in which "capital, labour and management are coordin-
ated and manifestly operative," then that description of business, "though
III The Queen v. Cadboro Bay Holdings Ltd., 77 D.T.C. 5115 (F.C.T.D.).
112 74 D.T.C. 1190 (T.R.B.).
113 Mr. Prociuk ruled that the corporation was not engaged in the conduct of an
active business itself, and therefore did not have income from an active business. Of
course, this reasoning has been invalidated by ESG Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C.
5224 per Walsh J. (F.C.T.D.) rev'd 76 D.T.C. 6158 per Jackett CJ. (F.C.A.), and it is
doubtful that the small difference (a flat fee plus a percentage fee) would be a sufficient
basis upon which to distinguish the cases.
114 75 D.T.C. 12 (T.R.B.).
115 75 D.T.C. 137 at 138 (T.R.B.).
116 The corporation did not retain a management firm to operate the premises, but
did employ a janitor to maintain the common areas.
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certainly not all-embracing, might... serve as a guideline in the interpretation
and application of section 125 (1) of the Act.""u 7
A recent administrative decision, Spence Building Ltd. v. MNR,118 re-
verts to the unaided degree of activity test in analysing the income derived
from renting a building to a partnership of medical practitioners for their
clinic. 119 The evidence indicated that the lessee was obligated by the lease to
take full responsibility for maintaining the property; the lessor was respon-
sible for municipal taxes, insurance and structural repairs only. Mr. Taylor
concluded on these novel facts that the degree of activity on the part of the
corporation was inadequate to constitute the conduct of an active business,
although it was equally clear that the undertaking was a business. Using the
Spence decision as a model of the activity test, a difficult question must be
resolved before the test is acceptable as a principle of tax jurisprudence. If a
quantum of activity is required to promote a source from business to active
business, what is that quantum, or is it to be measured by intuition, super-
stition, or commonsense?
The Queen v. Cadboro Bay Holdings Ltd.120 can be read as resolving
these points. The taxpayer corporation owned and operated a small shopping
centre, and operations were carried out by employees and agents of the cor-
poration. Mr. Justice Gibson set out a number of propositions which he be-
lieves constitute a compromise between the "quantum of activity" approach
and the functional approach. His first proposition, unsupported by any direct
authority, is that in order for income to qualify for section 125 treatment,
the "business activity" of the corporation must be of "sufficient quantum"
to be categorized as "income from 'an active business .... " ,1121 In Gibson J.'s
view, this proposition translated into a two-part test of active business, deter-
mining whether (a) the corporation had a business as defined in the Income
Tax Act and (b) that business was an active business. He justified this quan-
tum of activity approach by construing "active" as bearing its vernacular mean-
ing as used in leading cases in which the concept of business was in issue.122
Gibson J.'s second proposition is that cases construing other statutory
provisions are applicable in principle only and that the provisions of sections
125 and 129 must be construed according to the purpose of the legislation.
Relying on The Queen v. Rockmore Investments Ltd.,123 Gibson I. stated that
"active" does not exclude dormant businesses only, for section 125 deals with
the incomes of corporations, and thus "it must be assumed that the word 'active'
was used to exclude some businesses having sufficient activity in the year to give
117 75 D.T.C. 137 at 138.
118 77 D.T.C. 71 (T.R.B.).
119 Some of the partners were also shareholders of the corporation which leased
the premises, but this fact did not seem to have been given much weight.
120 77 D.T.C. 5115 (F.C.T.D.).
12177 D.T.C. at 5123.
122 As can be appreciated readily, the cases upon which Gibson J. supposedly relied
do not lead inexorably to his conclusion: See 77 D.T.C. at 5120-22.
123 76 D.T.C. 6156.
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rise to income.' 24 On the other hand, he asserts that "a business other than
an active business" refers to "income from a business that is in an 'absolute
state of suspension' and is devoid of any quantum of business activity, but
which has some asset which produces income.' '125
Locked into the necessity to define "business activity" or watch his
theory crumble, Gibson J. invokes the canon of construction which permits
a court to choose a rendering of an ambiguous term which will be "consistent
with the smooth working of the system" and presents a meaning of active busi-
ness which eliminates confusion: 12 6
[A]ny quantum of business activity that gives rise to income in a taxation year for
a private corporation in Canada is sufficient to make mandatory the characteriza-
tion of such income as income from an "active business carried on in Canada' 27
Thus the formulation "active business" calls for "business activity" before a
corporation qualifies to compute its tax liability under section 125. But the
concept of "business activity" is perhaps as elusive as the quantum of acti-
vity required to constitute active business.
D. The Functional Approach
It can be appreciated that Gibson J. merely substituted "business activity"
for "active" in the formulation "active business" in Cadboro Bay Holdings
Ltd. As his subsequent discussion reveals, "business activity" is virtually syn-
onymous with "business" as defined in section 248 (1).
Gibson J. swept away the myth that active business is any different from
business even while affirming that the two concepts are distinguishable. The
reasoning is convoluted, but there is no easy way to explain why two seemingly
discrete terms should operate similarly and have such similar definitions, unless
one accepts that the function of the phrase "active business" is to reserve the
small business tax credit for income from a bona fide business undertaking,
as distinguished from investment income. It is noteworthy that Gibson J.'s
formula applies not only to rental income, but also to interest, royalties, man-
agement fees and other marginalia. His Lordship sums up with a conviction
previously missing from section 125 decisions. The most important statements
are reproduced here:
(1) Any business within the meaning of section 248(1) of the Income Tax Act or
within the dictionary definition of business is a business.
124 77 D.T.C. 5115 at 5123.
125 Gibson J.'s unfortunate choice of terms creates an inconsistency; if he is to
be taken at face value, then "income from other than an active business" includes
(1) income from an income-producing asset held by a corporation which is in an
absolute state of suspension as well as (2) income of a corporation which has sufficient
activity to give rise to income but which does not derive from an active business.
126 Gibson J.'s reasoning can be criticized here because the difficulty in defining
"active business" is that it is a redundant term of broad and indeterminant reference;
it is, however, "ambiguous" in the sense that it has more than one usual and plausible
meaning.
127 77 D.T.C. at 5123.
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(2) Any business activity at all, of a private corporation in Canada, irrespective
of the quantum of it, is sufficient to make mandatory the characterization of
the income from such source for tax purposes income from an "active busi-
ness" within the meaning of section 125 of the Act.
(3) There may be many types or sources of income from an active business within
the meaning of section 125 of the Act. Such types or sources of income may
be or from rents, interest, royalties, management fees and so forth. The rele-
vant matter is whether from the particular type or source, income arose which
should be categorized as income from an "active business carried on in
Canada" by a private corporation within the meaning of section 125 of the Act.
(4) Investment income of a private corporation is certain income within the mean-
ing of section 129 of the Act. Such investment income is any income from a
source other than from "an active business carried on in Canada" within the
meaning of section 125 of the Act or from an "office" or "employment",
(see sections 3(1) and 248(1) of the Act) and includes income from "property".
(See section 3(1) of the Act.)128
So long as Cadboro Bay Holdings is a leading authority on the interpre-
tation of "active business," eligibility for the small business credit requires
only that the taxpayer have some "business activity." "Business activity"
(when considered without regard to quantum) will have to be defined as
business in its general sense. That is, factual evidence as to the quantum or
degree of activity will not be crucial to the categorization of income, but evi-
dence that an activity, no matter how miniscule, is a "business" activity instead
of an office, employment or property activity, is determinative. The tripartite
distinction between property, business and active business income has now
reverted to the old two way distinction between business and nonbusiness
income.
Despite the note of finality in the Cadboro Bay opinion, one issue re-
mains unresolved, and this is whether income generated from an adventure
in the nature of trade constitutes income from active business. Mr. Justice
Gibson is quite clear in his conclusion that if income derives from a source that
is business, then it derives from active business, and the fact that certain under-
takings are deemed business instead of business in the ordinary sense should
not make any difference. But there are three variations on "income from busi-
ness" which raises semantic difficulties if not substantive issues as well:
"carrying on business,"'129 "in the course of [carrying on] business,"'a 0 and
"active business." The semantic quirks arise when "adventure" is substituted
for "business" in these formulations. In Tara Exploration and Development
Co. v. MNR,131 President Jackett said that he thought that "carrying on
an adventure" was a grammatical absurdity; is it also an absurdity to speak
of "in the course of [carrying on] an adventure" or an "active adventure"?
Section 139(1)132 clearly stipulates that "[in this Act" (my emphasis)
business is to include an adventure in the nature of trade, but despite that
128 77 D.T.C. at 5123.
129 Section 2(3).
130 Section 18(1) (h).
13170 D.T.C. 6370 per Jackett P. (Ex. Ct.) aff'd 72 D.T.C. 6288 per Abbott J.
(S.C.C.).
132 Income Tax Act, S.C. 1952, c. 148, now s. 248(1) in Income Tax Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 63.
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direction, Tara Exploration has tentatively held that it is impossible for an
adventure to amount to "carrying on business" and two court decisions have
held that under section 68 an adventure did not constitute "active business."' 33
No doubt it would be arguable on the basis of these decisions to say that an
adventure does not fulfill any of the statutory requirements that refer to "in
the course of business" either, but the point has never arisen.
Implicit in President Jackett's analysis in Tara Exploration is the assump-
tion that "carrying on business" refers to ordinary business only. Not only
does he point to the semantic impossibility of "carrying on an adventure" but
he also states that an isolated transaction, even if "deemed" business, does
not display the requisite elements of "carrying on business" such as continuity
and repetition.134 In short, he reads the words "carrying on" as modifying
"business" and sets up a requirement that some repetition of transactions must
be displayed in the conduct of the undertaking.
One recent case, however, has attempted to deal with this proposition,
although the decision cannot be taken as having settled the issue. Birmount
Holdings Ltd. v. MNR' 35 arose on facts similar to those in Tara Exploration,
with one vital difference. Tara was formed to undertake mining exploration,
and the "adventure" was held to be unrelated to the ordinary business of the
corporation. That is why "adventure" had to be invoked in order to bring it
into income in the first place. Birmount Holdings, however, was formed to
hold one parcel of undeveloped land, and its objects were limited to that
single purpose. Thus it would have been difficult to hold that the transaction
fell outside the scope of the ordinary business of the corporation, because
either the corporation had no ordinary business, or the ordinary business
consisted of holding the land.
The threshhold question in Birmount Holdings was whether the sale of
the land generated business profits of any kind, or whether the corporation
should be treated as an investment vehicle, generating investment income only.
The effect of incorporation does not operate to classify all receipts of a cor-
poration as business receipts, 36 and certainly it is open to a court to conclude
that the operations of a holding company are investments. Accordingly, Sweet
D.J. held that the transaction was taxable as an adventure in the nature of
trade.137
Possibly because it was an isolated transaction, he did not go further
and decide whether the transaction constituted business in the ordinary sense.
However, he did deal with that precise issue in a slightly different manner,
133 Stekl v. MNR, 59 D.T.C. 1262 per Thorson P. (Ex. CL); Hillsdale Shopping
Centre Ltd. v. MNR, 77 D.T.C. 5256 per Cattanach J. (F.C.T.D.).
134 70 D.T.C. at 6376.
135 77 D.T.C. 5031 per Sweet D.J. (F.C.T.D.).
136 Hillsdale Shopping Centre Ltd. v. MNR, 77 D.T.C. 5256 at 5257 per Cattanach
I. (F.C.T.D.):
At the very most the incorporation of a company merely raises a presumption
of an intention to carry on business as outlined in the Memorandum but this
presumption may be rebutted and accordingly is not conclusive.
137 77 D.T.C. at 5039.
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when he considered whether the corporation was resident because it was
"carrying on business." Against the backdrop of the President Jackett's rea-
soning in Tara Exploration, "carrying on business" carries the connotation
of business in the ordinary sense. Here the relationship between the objects
of the corporation and the subject matter of the transaction was determina-
tive, for Sweet D.J. held that the transaction was not only an adventure, but
that the corporation "carried on business in and with the land.' u 8
Although Tara Exploration and Birmount Holdings can be and were
distinguished on a factual matter, the troublesome question remains: where
a corporation engages in an isolated transaction, can it ever be described as
carrying on business? President Jackett's reasoning is preferable inasmuch
as he bases his conclusion on a close reading of the words of the statute.
Sweet D.J., on the other hand, seems to believe that the effect of incorpora-
tion is an adequate evidentiary substitute for the element of continuity and
repetition so crucial to a finding of business in the ordinary sense.
The active business decisions under section 68(1) display the same
reluctance to read "business" as modified by "active" as including an adven-
ture or isolated transaction, notwithstanding the extended definition of "busi-
ness" in what was then section 139(1) (e). The first two decisions were fairly
anomolous, because the Minister was trying to establish that an adventure
did amount to an active business. In Baker Estates v. MNR, 32 the taxpayer
won because the transaction did not even constitute an adventure, being con-
sistent with the corporation's investment purposes. In No. 418 v. MNR140
however, Mr. Fordham rejected the Minister's proposition in an obiter dictum,
preferring to base his conclusion on the finding that the corporation did not
have an active business because it was "dormant," with no office, records or
compliance with formalities. Alternatively, he held that the corporation was
merely acting as the controlling shareholder's agent in the collection of oil
royalties and trading gains in oil permits, and had no business of its own.
Mr. Fordham's dictum was adopted sub silentio by President Thorson
in Stekl v. MNR,141 in which the shareholder-taxpayer was assessed on gains
realized by his personal corporation in the disposition of timber limits. The
appeal was brought on the ground that the transaction was on capital account,
but in holding that the taxpayer had been properly assessed, President Thorson
had to have concluded that the transaction did not constitute the conduct
of an active business.14
In the context of section 68 (1), adventure may have been denied classi-
fication as "active commercial, industrial or financial business" not because
138 The integrity of President Jackett's analysis in Tara can be retained if one views
the decision in Birmount Holdings as resting on the concept of business in the ordinary
sense and not mere adventure in the nature of trade.
139 54 D.T.C. 514 at 516 (T.A.B.) [official translation].
140 57 D.T.C. 243 (T.A.D.).
141 58 D.T.C. 494 (T.A.B.), afl'd 59 D.T.C. 1262 (Ex. Ct.).
142 The same analysis was imposed in Berman v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 49 (T.R.B.) and
Hillsdale Shopping Centre Ltd. v. MNR, 77 D.T.C. 5256 (F.C.T.D.).
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it was not "active," but because it was not "commercial, industrial or finan-
cial" business. The better view of "carrying on business" and "active business"
is that both phrases employ "business" in its widest statutory and jurispru-
dential meaning, which includes an adventure. Although the constructs "car-
rying on an adventure" or "active adventure" are ludicrous and ungrammatical,
to constrict the definition of "business" to its ordinary sense whenever it is
used in a grammatical unit with an inelegant verb is inconsistent with the sta-
tutory definition of business. Thus when a corporation seeks to classify income
from an adventure as income from an active business, there should be no
objection by the Department: business activity and business intention are
present. "Business" when modified by "active" has no special or restricted
meaning, and thus the profits would be income from an active business.
E. Policy as an Aid to Construction
MRT Investments Ltd. v. The Queen,'14 although affirmed by the Federal
Court of Appeal on slightly different grounds, illustrates the third possible
approach to describing active business-the "purpose" approach. Words in
a taxation statute should be given their ordinary meaning consistent with the
context in which they are used and the purpose of the provision. 44 Because
of legislative waffling during the infancy of the 1972 Act, however, two argu-
ments as to the "purpose" of the active business provision can be made.
First, the enactment of the rules concerning ineligible investments 4 5 can be
interpreted as limiting the scope of operation of section 125, even though the
ineligible investments provisions were repealed as of their effective date. The
second view is that the repeal of the limiting provision must be interpreted as
signifying Parliament's intention to extend the small business credit to any
operation which fell within the literal meaning of an active business. The
latter argument was accepted by Mr. Justice Walsh in MRT Investment Ltd.,
opening the way to giving "active business" its full literal meaning without
regard to the type of business.
Walsh J. held that the taxpayer corporations' diminutive money lend-
ing operations constituted active businesses because there was nothing in the
statutory provision that excluded investment companies from that classica-
tion.146 On a factual analysis, active business is broadly defined in the MRT
decisions. The income for 1972 against which the plaintiffs sought to take
the small business deduction was $12,200 in mortgage interest by ESG, and
a total of $4,600 in interest, rental and service income for Rockmore. The
143 75 D.T.C. 5224 per Walsh J. (F.C.T.D.) aff'd, 76 D.T.C. 6158 per Jackett C.J.
(F.C.A.).
144 E. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 81-
84, quoted in MRT Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 75 D.T.C. 5224 (F.C.T.D.).
145 Sections 188, 189 of the 1972 Act, repealed by S.C. 1973-74, c. 14, s. 60, appli-
cable to 1972 and subsequent years. Part V provided for a refundable tax on ineligible
investments, and "ineligible investments" were defined by section 189(4) (b) as "property
that was not acquired for the purpose of gaining or producing income from an active
business... except money ... [and] obligations ...
140 75 D.T.C. at 5234.
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three corporations were operated out of a common office, although only ESG
paid for management, rent, telephone and bookkeeping. Under section 68 (1),
the only investment operation that was granted the status of active business
was a mortgage investment operation in Graham v. MRT,147 in which the
appellant taxpayer had over $250,000 invested in a mortgage business to which
he devoted full-time managerial efforts. In MRT Investments, however, the
amount invested was much less, and the management was merely part time.
The liberalization of the concept "active business' displayed in MRT
Investments was foreshadowed by earlier board rulings on moneylending.
Judge Flanigan set the tone in Cosmopolitan Investments Co. v. MNR 48
when he held that a mortgage investment company which had only $9,500
invested in mortgages at the end of the tax year had an active business.1 4
Subsequent rulings varied the general rule only slightly. Lazare Investments
Corp. v. MNR150 and Parico Ltde v. MNR'r1 follow the new tradition of
granting the small business credit to small, almost ephemeral mortgage invest-
ment companies that would not have been classed as active businesses under
the 1952 Act.
However, the line between investment and active business is a fine one,
as demonstrated by two other rulings which placed emphasis on the subjective
relationship between the corporation and the borrowers. In L. & F. Holdings
Ltd. v. MNR152 mortgage loans to friends of the corporation's controlling
shareholder were not business activities; in Marlee Investments Ltd. v. MNR,168
income from a note, six mortgages and a small building was not income from
active business because the corporation, managed by the controlling share-
holder through his law office, appeared to be no more than an alter ego of
the shareholder. The decision did not discuss that point, but focused on the
degree of activity and incidents of corporate existence.
147 70 D.T.C. 1747 (T.A.B.); cf. Glaspie v. MNR, 63 D.T.C. 828 (T.A.B.);
McCorkell v. MNR, 61 D.T.C. 154 (T.A.B.).
148 74 D.T.C. 1252 (T.R.B.).
149 Contra, L. & F. Holdings Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 150 (T.R.B.); Marlee Invest-
ments Ltd. v. MNR, 75 D.T.C. 153 (T.R.B.); Mr. St-Onge's refusal to allow the taxpayer
in L. & F. Holdings to take the small business deduction is attributable to the fact that
the $274,000 invested in some 16 mortgages was borrowed largely from family members
and loaned to family friends, none of whom were deemed to deal at arm's length-al-
though the clients certainly seemed to be obligated for the rate of interest usual to this
type of transaction. In Marlee Investments, he merely held that the taxpayer, which had
some 6 mortgages outstanding, producing $17,000 in payments, was "not very active".
Of course, L. & F. Holdings and Marlee Investments could be viewed as setting the
proper standard if Cosmopolitan is seen as an anomoly-the result being explained by
the fact that the appellant corporation was once upon a time a thriving and extensive
money lending operation which had experienced reversals but retained the potential for
significant financial activity.
150 75 D.T.C. 26 (T.R.B.).
15175 D.T.C. 173 (T.R.B.).
152 75 D.T.C. 150 (T.R.B.)-the taxpayer's appeal was allowed on a consent judg-
ment in January 1977.
3-5 75 D.T.C. 153 (T.R.B.), (now under appeal).
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F. The Antiavoidance Construction
The theme of self dealing is ubiquitous, and to the extent that it can
arise in relation to almost any type of business operation, it is significant in
ascertaining eligibility for the small business tax credit. The question arises
in the context of three common types of incorporated undertakings: manage-
ment operations, professional practices and incorporated hobbies. The main
issue in each case is not whether the corporation has a business in the ordinary
sense-for it is submitted that the substance of the operations will easily
constitute a business-but whether the small business credit should be denied
on other grounds.
1. Management Operations
Management operations have recently been the subject of litigation, and
the decisions indicate that so long as the corporation has a bona fide business
undertaking, the corporation will be treated as a separate legal entity, entitling
it to the tax benefits of incorporation, if any.154 Taking Mr. Justice Gibson's
two part test of active business, it is apparent that if a management corporation
survives the scrutiny given to alleged sham transactions, then it should also
qualify for the small business credit as a corporation that carries on business
and earns income through "business activities."
In the one case dealing with the eligibility of management operations for
the small business credit, DSBK Management Ltd. v. MNR, 55 the taxpayer
appears to have been disqualified from using the credit on the basis that it
did not have a bona fide business undertaking. The shareholders of the cor-
poration were accountants who were partners in an accounting firm, and their
wives. Although the corporate charter disclosed that the purpose of the cor-
poration was to provide management services to professionals "and others,"
the records of the company, disclosed that the management firm's only client
was the accounting firm. Mr. Frost summed up this relationship by noting
that "[a]side from performance of professional duties, the professionals were
managing themselves, and there was little left to manage."'156
Mr. Frost analysed three major factors in arriving at his conclusion:
(1) the volume and frequency of transactions, (2) the quality and nature of
management decisions that are required to generate income and (3) the use
made of capital and labor. He also ascribed secondary importance to the fact
of incorporation and the declared objects in the corporate charter. No men-
154 See generally D. Bonham, Judicial Treatment of the Corporate Entity Concept
in Canadian Tax Law (1967), 6 Western Ont. L. Rev. 39; J. Hausman, The 'One-Man
Company'-Some Principles of Taxation (1967), 13 McGill L.J. 265; D. Matheson,
Service Corporations (1976), 24 Can. Tax J. 329; W. Mitchell, Taxation and the Corpo-
rate Veil (1966), 14 Can. Tax J. 534; G. Tamaki, Lifting the Corporate Veil in Cana-
dian Income Tax Law (1962), 8 McGill LJ. 159.
151 75 D.T.C. 219 (T.R.B.). The taxpayers appeal to the Federal Court was discon-
tinued upon a consent to judgment on June 9, 1977. However, the Tax Review Board's
analysis continues to be instructive.
IN 75 D.T.C. 220 at 221.
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tion was made of the formalistic attributes of doing business, such as office
space, staff, stationery, etc. The overriding consideration in evaluating the
activity of a management company, however, was described as "what manage-
ment is doing":
The function of management is to gain, and if possible to enhance, profits by
bringing into harmonious relationship all the successful elements of a business. If
management skills require deliberate action to enhance profits, the business so
managed is, in my opinion, likely to be of an active nature. Management may be
provided by virtue of special contract or through it what management is doing,
not who does it.157
Mr. Frost found that management was inactive-the financial statements in-
dicated "little activity," the management fee consisted of a flat five percent of
the accounting firm's expenses and the use of capital and labor was "relatively
insignificant" because no such expenses were reflected on the financial state-
ments. This line of reasoning suggests that business in the ordinary sense and
active business can be distinguished, for there is little question that unless
there is some evidence of a tax avoidance motive for the incorporation, the
operation would be treated as a business. One could conclude, then, that one
management contract is insufficient to constitute an active business even if it
is a business.' 58
A contradictory line of reasoning is introduced by Mr. Frost's assertion
that "Parliament never contemplated the sort of activity carried on by the
appellant company as qualifying for the said section."' 59 Having admitted that
the undertaking was an "activity" or "business activity," DSBK Management
Ltd. emerges as the result of antiavoidance sentiment instead of dispassionate
analysis. Unfortunately, not even the antiavoidance grounds are clearly
articulated, and thus it would appear that another bona fide management
operation could still be subject to attack either for non-arm's length contracts
or for the size of its client list.'6°
One other avenue of attack on a management corporation is described
in Smith v. MNR,' 61 in which a management corporation was denied active
business status when the evidence disclosed that its agent (a controlling share-
holder of both the taxpayer and client corporations) was acting in his capa-
city as an officer of the client corporation and not as an agent of the taxpayer.
In essence, this is a variation on the sham doctrine, but the reasoning is per-
tinent to the recent surge of interest in incorporating the administrative and
157 ld. at 220.
158 Cf. Revenue Ruling 14.
159 75 D.T.C. 220 at 221.
160 See also ACR Corporate Services Ltd. v. MNR, 76 D.T.C. 1323 (T.R.B.).
16170 D.T.C. 6344 (Ex. Ct.). See also Shulman v. MNR, 61 D.T.C. 1213 (Ex.
Ct.) in which Ritchie J. held that a solicitor who formed a corporation for the
purpose of providing management services for the solicitor's law firm, through the
agency of the solicitor himself, had merely established a conduit through which to with-
draw money from the operating revenue of the law firm and return it as a loan. The
judgment clearly indicates, however, that if an "unrelated" management firm had been
employed, the management fees paid would have been a bona fide expense of the law
firm.
[VOL. 16, NO. 1
Active Business
management side of professional practices, especially where incorporation of
the practice itself is barred. Characteristic of all such arrangements is a non-
arm's length relation, and DSBK Management and Smith are by themselves
inadequate to determine the extent to which the credit is available for such
operations. However, it is submitted that an arm's length management corpora-
tion which manages a professional practice would be entitled to use the small
business credit.
The crucial question in determining whether a corporation has a bona
fide management business or is engaged in a non-arm's length transaction is
largely a matter of degree and circumstance. The rigid objective view of such
relations is slowly giving way to a more subjective view which assesses evi-
dence as to the parties' past and proposed conduct. Thus the capacity and
potential to attract and service arm's length clients, coupled with some evidence
of intention to do so within a reasonable time, would be sufficient to establish
a corporation as having a bona fide business.' 62 Beyond that, it is safe to say
that evidence of an arm's length client would establish that the corporation had
"any business activity at all." Where there are no arm's length clients, but there
is substantial business activity, the weight of authority would hold that there
is no active business. Whether the basis for doing so would be a finding of
self dealing or tax avoidance is impossible to predict at this time.
2. Professional Corporations
The incorporation of the professions is a contentious topic, and one of
the more controversial aspects of the debate is whether a professional corpora-
tion is entitled to the small business credit. 68 Since there is absolutely no
question that the practice of a professional constitutes business in the ordinary
sense,164 and as well, an active business, the issue reduces itself to determining
whether section 125 applies to professional corporations, or whether for some
arcane reason the statute must be construed as excluding professional cor-
porations.
One perfectly sensible argument is that professional corporations do not
have the kinds of businesses section 125 was designed to encourage, and that
the small business credit cannot be claimed for such income. Proponents of
this position could point out that professional corporations were not extant
at the time of the enactment of section 125, and that the shortlived ineligible
investments provision makes it clear that only corporations of the commercial,
financial or industrial ilk were within Parliament's contemplation. These points,
when coupled with commentary as to the purpose of the small business credit
162 See also D. Matheson, Service Corporations (1976), 24 Can. Tax J. 329.
163 H. Graschuk, The Professional Corporation in Alberta (1977), 25 Can. Tax J.
109 at 113-14.
164Davies v. Braithwaite (1931), 18 T.C. 198 at 204; Seni v. MNR, 63 D.T.C. 694
(T.A.B.); No. 361 v. MNR, 56 D.T.C. 478 (T.A.B.). In Seni v. MNR, the issue was
whether certain consulting fees, payments for teaching and other payments for services
rendered by an engineer who was not yet licensed in Canada because of a citizenship
requirement constituted income from business or employment. He was found to be
engaged in a professional business.
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and the history of its enactment, make a strong argument against permitting
a corporation with a professional business or other atypical business under-
taking to utilize the credit.
The weakness of this argument is obvious: there is nothing in the lan-
guage of section 125 to support the proposition that certain types of active
businesses are to be precluded from the meaning of active business. Again
referring to Gibson J.'s two part proposition in The Queen v. Cadboro Bay
Holdings Ltd.,165 a professional corporation has a business, for section 248 (1)
expressly stipulates that "business" includes a profession, and practice of a
profession would undoubtedly constitute "any business activity at all." With
the exception of DSBK Management Ltd. v. MNR 66 and some of the earlier
administrative rulings, the courts consistently have refused to recognize any
limitations as to the type of operation to which the credit applies, in the absence
of express language.
One final argument which might avail those who would deny the credit
to professional corporations is that the corporation itself does not "have"
the active business and that the permissive nature of a statute facilitating in-
corporation of a professional practice does not confer upon such a corpora-
tion the same status as a business corporation. 167 If the corporation is not
carrying on the business through its organs and agents, then it may not take
the credit in respect of income from that source. The sentiments of the parti-
cipants in the debate are clear, but the legal theory upon which they are
founded is not. The debate promises to continue for some time yet.
3. Incorporated Hobbies
Aside from hobby farming, the tax treatment of hobbies has not at-
tracted much attention in Canada. One point that is likely to arise in future
litigation, however, is the eligibility of incorporated hobbies for the small
business credit. Since corporations are generally deemed to be carrying on
business for all purposes, before the Department could launch an attempt to
exclude hobby income from active business income it would have to establish
that the income arose in the pursuit of the controlling shareholders' pleasure.
There is enough case law in Canada to facilitate the distinction between
hobby receipts and income from business, and thus the issue is whether such
receipts, if classified as business income, would be treated as "active business"
income.
Again, the literal meaning of "active business" and the purpose of the in-
centive dictate opposing results. Using Mr. Justice Gibson's approach, a hobby
which had crossed the line into "business" would display "business activity"
165 77 D.T.C. 5115 (F.C.T.D.).
166 75 D.T.C. 219 (T.R.B.).
167 In the Alberta Companies Act, supra note 150, doctors, lawyers, dentists and
accountants remain fully liable for their professional work, and the registration of such
a "corporation" terminates upon the death, disentitlement, etc. of the corporation's
professional. Granted that the corporation is a fictional entity, but the "professional
corporation" seems to be an "artificial fiction", and inadequate to shield its principal
from current taxation on all fees at full personal rates.
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as well, and fall within the ordinary meaning of "active business." On the
other hand, it is unlikely that Parliament intended to encourage sportscar rac-
ing, horseracing, writing, prospecting or lottery gambling by means of section
125. Unfortunately, "active business" is too crude a tool to effectively exclude
these pleasurable forms of profit production.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Part of the purpose of this article has been to explore and analyse the
concept of active business as it has emerged to date. The vagueness and re-
dundance of the phrase has generated confusion and controversy as to its
application, and this has been a preliminary effort to identify the definitional
frameworks being used and the validity of each approach. Although the "pur-
pose" and "level of activity" approaches have some superficial attraction,
the functional approach, in which active business is assimilated to business
as defined in section 248 (1) of the Act, is the preferable view, and the one
certain to be anointed by time.
The other purpose of the article has been to use business receipts from
hobby, professional, property, etc. undertakings to illustrate how inadequate
the phrase "active business" is in attaining Parliament's'avowed intention of
stimulating new and small business. The provision as initially structured would
have given the courts guidelines to consider, when asked, to extend the ac-
cepted scope of the phrase, and a suitably narrow definition would have
emerged. With the alteration of the provision as of its effective date, however,
there were no guidelines available, and the wide import of "business" even-
tually was attributed to "active business," robbing the modifier "active" of
meaning. While Parliament ultimately rejected a rigid and narrow scope of
application for the small business incentive, it is unlikely that it contemplated
or desired a broad definition either.
Since a broad concept of "active business" is reflected in the two court
decisions thus far, it is unlikely that reference to the intended purpose of
section 125 will be sufficient to effect any change. If Parliament is serious
about carving out a tax concession for economically beneficial operations,
then it will be necessary to refine the definition of "active business" altogether,
or else the credit should be denied to corporations which derive more than a
certain portion of their receipts from enumerated sources, reverting in part
to the pattern of the personal corporation legislation.
This is not to suggest that explicit statutory description of all of the com-
ponents of "active business" will resolve the issues conclusively. Many of the
issues, especially those concerning income from property, cannot be resolved
with any precision because they are dependent upon fact, circumstances, in-
ference and sometimes hidden motives.
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